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PETER NEALis*
The recent suit by the Justice Department against the Microsoft
Corporation reinvigorates the discussion surrounding the most effective and
efficient way to adjudicate antitrust cases. The traditional methodfor evaluating
certain antitrust cases, the rule of reason, has been criticized as being expensive,
and difflcult to administer. One consequence to these shortcomings is that an
antitrust defendant will almost always avoid liability under the rule of reason.
This Note suggests that the traditional rule of reason approach should no longer
be employed in antitrust cases. Rather, cases involving Section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act should be adjudicated under a new process. Under this amended
process, courts would no longer undergo extensive investigation of the economic
impact of an agreement falling under the rule of reason. Instead, any agreement
formerly adjudicated under the rule of reason would be declared per se legal
and be dismissed. The author rationalizes this drastic change by arguing that the
free market has a comparative advantage over the courts in evaluating rule of
reason cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed by Congress in response
to the increased dominance of the monopolizing trustI According to its language,
Section 1 of the Sherman Act works to prohibit "[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade."2 However, the
courts have refused to apply a literal interpretation to Section 1. Doing so would
make nearly every business arrangement illegal, because it is difficult to have a
business arrangement without it also working to restrain trade
* Special thanks to Professor James E. Meeks, Brad Ferrel, and Jeremy Siegfiried for
comments on earlier drafts of this Note. This Note is dedicated to my parents and family for
their constant support.
I See Eleanor M. Fox, The Poltics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making:
Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 563 (1986); Jennifer E. Gladieux, Comment,
Towards a Single Standard for Antitrust: The Federal Trade Commission's Evolving Rule of
Reason, 5 GEo. MASON L. REv. 471,475 (1997). For a more detailed discussion of the history
of the passing of the Sherman Act, see infra notes 17-25 and accompanying text
2 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
3 For example, consider a situation in which two lawyers forming a partnership agree not
to compete with each other outside of the partnership. This agreement would impose some
restraint upon competition. Under the express language of Section 1, such an agreement would
be illegal, even though the agreement imposes minimal restraints upon competition, and serves
a legitimate purpose. See Phillip Areeda, The Rule ofReason-A Catechism on Competition, 55
ANTrrauST 571,572 (1986).
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As a result, at the outset of an antitrust case, courts have typically classified
Section 1 cases as falling into one of two categoriesA On one hand are the
agreements deemed to have a clear, negative effect upon competition, without any
sort of procompetitive justification. Such agreements are said to fall under the per
se rule.5 Agreements not found to fall under the per se rule have been traditionally
adjudicated under what is called the rule ofreason.6
An antitrust case will be given markedly different treatment depending upon
whether or not it falls under the per se rule or the rule of reason. Under the per se
rule, the agreement is illegal without any investigation into the actual effect of the
agreement upon the market.7 Under the rule of reason, courts typically undertake
a full investigation of the agreement's actual impact upon the economy as well as
any procompetitive effects which might justify such an agreement.8 The rule of
reason was intended to provide an opportunity for novel business practices to
come under close and careful scrutiny so that their true economic effect might be
evaluated.9 While the concept behind the rule of reason is admirable, the rule of
reason is severely flawed in its practical application. It is an expensive process
which imposes substantial costs upon the litigants.10 Additionally, it asks either
jury members or judges to understand and evaluate complex economic theory and
data, despite the fact that very few judges or jury members are trained in
4 Although the categorization of an antitrust case as falling under the rule of reason or the
per se rule is an initial matter that must be decided before the case is (theoretically) decided on
the merits, it is rarely a simple process. Typically there will be extensive and heated litigation
over whether a particular agreement falls under the per se rule or the rule of reason. See infra
notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
5 See notes 91-101 infra and accompanying text.
6 See id
7 One of the most striking characteristics of the per se rule is its breadth. Agreements
found to fall under the per se rule are automatically illegal, even where their actual effect may
be beneficial to competition. See, e.g., Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and
Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTIRusT 167, 187 (1997)
("mhe substantive per se rule takes a formalistic approach that focuses on the intrinsic nature
of certain restraints, eschewing any inquiry into the effects of such restraints on competition").
The rationale for the arbitrary nature of the per se rule is that the gains from striking down
anticompetitive behavior outweigh the potential costs of striking down behavior that actually
aids competition. In addition, certain administrative costs will be reduced by imposition of a per
se rule. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9-10
(1984) ("The costs of these unfortunate condemnations are less than the costs-both litigation
and error costs-of making decisions case by case about competitive benefit").
8 See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The rule of
reason standard as articulated in Chicago has been universally adopted by other courts in
applying the rule of reason. See infra note 68-71 and accompanying text.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 221-223.10 See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text
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economics. 1I One consequence of these flaws is that in a rule of reason case, the
antitrust defendant will almost always win.12 Commentators have suggested
many ways to simplify or alter the rule of reason in order to create a more
efficient and just result 13 However, alterations to the rule do little where the rule
itself is inherently flawed.
This Note suggests that the rule of reason should no longer be employed in
antitrust cases. Rather, Section 1 cases should be adjudicated under a new
process. As before, those agreements falling under the per se rule would be
declared automatically illegal. However, for agreements falling under the rule of
reason, courts would no longer'bndergo extensive investigation of a particular
agreement's economic impact Instead, any agreement that formerly would have
been adjudicated under the rule of reason would not be evaluated by the courts at
all, but would be declared Per Se Legal and be dismissed. Admittedly this would
represent a drastic change in the field of antitrust adjudication-elimination of the
rule of reason would mean the elimination of a judicial device that has been used
by the courts for over eighty years.14 Its removal is premised upon the theory that
the free market has a comparative advantage over the courts in evaluating rule of
reason cases.
This Note discusses the rule of reason, and how its removal might create
fairer and more efficient antitrust adjudication. Part II will discuss the evolution of
the rule ofreason, from its inception in 1911 to its current application. Part I will
discuss the practical problems posed by the rule of reason, and how these
problems are an inherent part of the rule of reason. Part IV will discuss why the
use of a per se legality standard might be the best way to adjudicate antitrust cases
formerly adjudicated under the rule of reason-focusing primarily upon the
economic theory of comparative advantage. Part IV will also apply this suggested
per se legality standard to the most important antitrust case in recent memory-
the pending suit brought by the Justice Department against the Microsoft
Corporation.15
II. THB DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF REASON
A. Background: The Goals of the Sherman Act
Perhaps the best way to begin a discussion of the rule of reason is to discuss
11 See infra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
12 See infra Part I.C.5.
13 See infra Part 111.B.
14 The Supreme Court first formally adopted a reasonableness test under Section 1" in
1911. See infra Part II.C2.
15 See Plaintiff's Complaint, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (No. 98-1232), available at
<http'//www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/fl700/1763.htm> (visited Apr. 20,2000).
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the goals of the Sherman Act itself. As one commentator writes, "[a]ntitrust
policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a firm answer to one
question: What is the point of the law-what are its goals? Everything else
follows from the answer we give."'16
The Sherman Act was passed in 1890 in response to the development and
growth of the monopolizing trust.17 However, it remains unclear what should be
the policy objective of the Sherman Act. The language of the Sherman Act is
broad, written in almost constitutional terms.18 The primary lobbying group
behind the Sherman Act consisted of small business people, including farmers. 19
16 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTrrRusT PARADOX 50 (Free Press 1993) (1978).
17 See Fox, supra note 1, at 563; Gladieux, supra note 1, at 475. As companies and
markets grew in size, companies within certain markets began to vigorously compete with one
another to the point of trying to eliminate their business competitors. There was a rise in public
sentiment against these new business practices, and as a result, there were attempts by state
courts to revoke the charters of certain businesses which were found to be employing unfair
business behavior. See DANIEL J. GIFFORD & LEO 3. RASKIND, FEDERAL ANTITRUST CASES
AND MATERIALS, 3-6 (1998). For an example of where a state was successful in revoking the
charter of a business employing unfair business practices under state law, see generally People
v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 3 N.Y. Supp. 401 (1889), affd, 24 N.E. 834 (1890) (finding
a transfer of management powers to a board of directors to be not allowed under the company's
charter).
However, attempts to curb unfair business practices under state law were thwarted by the
increased popularity of a business structure known as the "trust," which allowed a business to
move its charter from one state to another without actually moving its physical assets.
Therefore, a corporation could easily transfer its place of existence from one state to another in
order to avoid the jurisdiction of certain state courts. As a result, there was a rise in popular
sentiment for Congress to use Federal Law in order to control the business practices of these
"trusts." Due to the rise in popular sentiment, Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890. See
GIFFORD & RASKInD, supra, at 3-6.
18 In describing the language of the Act, Chief Justice Stone has commented in dictum:
The prohibitions of the Sherman Act were not stated in terms of precision or of crystal
clarity and the Act itself did not define them. In consequence of the vagueness of its
language, perhaps not uncalculated, the courts have been left to give content to the statute,
and in performance of that function it is appropriate that courts should interpret its word in
the light of its legislative history and of the particular evils at which the legislation was
aimed.
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,489 (1940).
19 See Fox, supra note 1, at 563-64. In the years following the Civil War, from 1865 to
1890, there was a degree of commercial tension and rivalry between the agrarian sector of the
American economy and an emerging industrial sector. As a means of defending themselves in
this rivalry, American farmers developed into a powerful and influential political force, which
came to be known as the Granger Movement GIFFORD & RASKIND, supra note 17, at 1-2. As
firms in the industrial sector began to more vigorously compete with one another, they began to
employ certain business practices which were thought to be harmful to the agrarian sector. For
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However, the legislative history of the Act could be read to support any number
of policy objectives, from the protection of smaller businesses to the
maximization of efficiency and consumer welfare 0
Today most commentators,2 1 as well as the courts,22 agree the overriding
goal of the Sherman Act should be economic efficiency 3 This is largely because
example, in his attempt to expand his Standard Oil Empire, John D. Rockefeller was able to
obtain preferential railroad freight rates to ship his oil. One consequence of these preferential
rates was that the railroads had to compensate by charging higher rates to other customers,
including those trying to ship agrarian products. Id. at 4 (citing Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin
Klein, Monopolization by Raising Rivals' Costs: The Standard Oil Case, 39 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1996)). Such pricing practices were perceived as hanmfiul to farming interests, and as a result
the agrarian political voice cried out against these new business methods. Id
20 See Gladieux, supra note 1, at 475 ("[A]n examination of legislative history reveals
testimonial support from the drafters for almost any policy goal, from the promotion of 'small
dealers and worthy men' to the overriding emphasis on the maximization of efficiency and
consumer welfare.") (citations omitted). Many commentators have attempted to establish the
overriding policy goals of the Sherman Act from its legislative history. See, e.g., Robert H.
Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966); Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J 65 (1982).
21 There are two variations on the view that the Sherman Act should be interpreted to
promote the goal of economic efficiency. Some commentators, such as Robert Bork, have
concluded that Congress actually intended to promote economic efficiency as the primary goal
of the Sherman Act. See generally BORK, supra note 16; Bork, supra note 20. Other
commentators, such as Judges Easterbrook and Posner, feel that economic efficiency should be
the goals promoted by the Sherman Act regardless of what Congress intended. See generally,
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted
Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282
(1975); Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696 (1986). Cf
John J. Flynn and James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical
Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution of Antitrust
Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1125, 1136 (1987). Flynn and Ponsoldt are critical of both
variations. They argue that Bork is misreading the legislative history of the Sherman Act Iad at
1137-41. They also argue that Easterbrook and Posner do not show proper deference to the
views of Congress. Id at 1114-45; see also Lande, supra note 20 (arguing that a strict
adherence to economic efficiency as the dominant policy goal of the Sherman Act is becoming
a less popular view).
22 See, e.g., National Soc. of Prof. Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 ("The
Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only
lower prices, but also better goods and services."); see also Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 n.14 (1984) (stating that the law protects competition, not
individual competitors); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488
(1977) (same).
23 The emphasis upon efficiency as the overriding policy in antitrust law has been termed
the "Chicago School." Gladieux, supra note 1 at n.22 (citing Richard A. Posner, The Chicago
School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979)).
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economic efficiency serves as a value-free goal which prevents judges from
imposing their own personal views of what exactly represents a fair business
practice.24 For instance, if courts were able to use the Sherman Act to protect
small businesses, then the courts would enjoy complete discretion to condemn
any business practice deemed to be unfair, despite the fact that the practice will
help consumers by improving product quality, increasing product quantity, and
reducing price.25
However, even where economic efficiency is accepted as the goal of antitrust
law, uncertainty still remains. First, there has been disagreement over what is
actually meant by the term "economic efficiency." While most case law seems to
suggest that the antitrust laws should be read to maximize pure consumer
welfare,26 it has been suggested that the antitrust laws be read to maximize
"aggregate economic welfare," which is consumer welfare in addition to
stockholder profits.27 There are also differences of opinion as to what economic
model actually represents the marketplace.28 Are most firms rationally trying to
2 4 See Michael P. Kenny & William FL Jordan, The United States v. Microsoft: Into the
Antitrust Regulatory Vacuum Missteps the Department of Justice, 47 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1364
(1998) ('The salubrious focus on consumer welfare not only has universal applicability, but it
also constrains courts from indulging in the fimdamentally misguided belief that government
agents, rather than market forces, can best determine the allocation of resources.). But see Fox,
supra note 1, at 576-7 (asserting that the use of economics as a blueprint for antitrust law still
provides courts with ample opportunity to make their own judgments).
2 5 See Kenny & Jordan, supra note 24, at 1364-65 (citing I PHiLip E. AREEDA,
ANTTRUSrT LAw 11 (1986)).
[Much of the legislative debates over the antitrust laws reveal that individual members of
Congress were concerned about protecting small competitors from larger, lower cost, or
more aggressive rivals. For one who believes that small business is a valuable part of
American business culture, such a concern is appealing. But once it is accepted, what
defines its limits? Should we then use the antitrust laws to condemn any innovation,
merger, or distribution practice that reduces the defendant's costs with the result that
smaller firms are placed at a disadvantage?...
But almost certainly Congress intended no such thing. It never wanted a rule that
would condemn all innovations or cost-reducing (or product enhancing) policies that
injured rivals.
Id
26 See, e.g., United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149
(E.D.N.Y. 1997)); Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic
Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV., 617, 647, n.84 (citing FTC
v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
27 See BORK, supra note 16, at 107-15; see also Salop & Romaine, supra note 26, at 646,
n.83 (discussing whether or not Bork's aggregate welfare standard should also include the
shareholder profits of the excluded firm).
28 See generally, GiFFORD & RASKIND, supra note 17, at 10-11.
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maximize profits?29 Or do firms operate with other goals in mind?30 Different
assumptions about how firms operate will naturally affect how one feels that
antitrust law should be applied. As one commentator notes: "It is characteristic of
antitrust law that differing perceptions of anti-competitive conduct in different
cases comes about from varying premises of the underlying model that is applied
to the problem."31 Even where one consensus economic model of the economy is
accepted, there remains disagreement as to what types of behavior are best for the
economy.3 2 Suggested approaches have ranged from substantial government
regulatory control to absolutely no regulatory control at all.33 Thus, even where
the goals of antitrust are clear, the methods of obtaining those goals are not
This discussion of the goals of the Sherman Act helps show how difficult
adjudication of antitrust laws can be. In most areas of law, the goals to be served
are fairly clear-fairness, equality, protection of rights. 4 People generally have
an idea of what kind of solution to a problem is fair or promotes equality.
However, antitrust law is generally understood to promote efficiency.35 It is
29 See, e.g., RiCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAw 4 (4th ed. 1992)
('he concept of man as a rational maximizer of his self-interest implies that people respond to
incentives-that if a person's surroundings change in such a way that he could increase his
satisfactions by altering his behavior, he will do so. From this proposition derive
the... fundamental principles of econonics.).
30 See, eg., Kenneth Arrow, Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics, 20
ECONOMIC INQUIRY 1 (1993) ("[A]n important class of intemporal markets shows systematic
deviations from individual rational behavior....'); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C.
Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE
L.J. 209 (1986) (arguing that many firms employ strategic behavior to raise competitors' costs).
31 GIFFORD & RASKIND, szpra note 17, at 11.
32 See Fox, supra note 1, at 573 ("There are several conceptions of the best way, or at least
of promising ways, to promote allocative efficiency.").
3 3 See id
34 See id at 555. Fox characterizes different areas of law as falling upon different areas of
a spectrum. ("Antitrust law stands at one end of a spectrum; it is among the legal disciplines that
are most nearly efficiency-based. Constitutional law stands atthe other end of the spectrum; it is
the genre of law that is most clearly rights-, freedom-, and process-based.") Id
3 5 Disagreements even arise as to what is meant by the term efficiency. See, e.g., Richard
S. Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easterbrook 63 TEx. L.
REV. 41, 45-48 (1984) (noting the distinction between organizational allocative efficiency and
competitive impact efficiency). Markovits argues that some activities may increase competitive
impact efficiency, while at the same time decreasing organizational allocative efficiency. See id.
at 45-46. An example of this would be a tying arrangement, where a consumer is forced to buy
a desirable product (the tying product) only if she also buys a less desirable product (the tied
product). Markovits argues that such an arrangement may actually reduce organizational
allocative efficiency by taking away more wealth from consumers than what is given to
producers. See id at 48. At the same time, Markovits asserts that the arrangement might not
decrease competitive impact efficiency because consumers will still be presented with the same
offers by alternative suppliers. See id
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unclear even what type of economic model represents that goal, or what steps
should be taken to reach it.
B. Early Application of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
From the basic language of Section 1, it would seem that any restraint of
trade brought out by a contract combination, or conspiracy would be an illegal
one, no matter how minimal the restraint upon trade.3 6 This seems to be the initial
approach of the United States Supreme Court. In the 1897 case, United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Association,3 7 eighteen railroads, who controlled rail
traffic west of the Mississippi River, had created an association which set the
same freight rates for all of the railroads.3 8 The United States Government
thought that this association was a violation of the Sherman Act and therefore
brought suit under the Act.39 In its defense, Trans-Missouri argued that Section 1
of the Sherman Act prohibited only those agreements that would have been found
unreasonable under the common law.40 Since the Trans-Missouri price agreement
kept prices at a reasonable level, the agreement was legal under the Sherman
Act41
A majority of the Justices disagreed with this argument noting that the
language of the Act clearly forbids all agreements in restraint of trade, regardless
of whether the restraint was reasonable or not.42 In an opinion written by Justice
Pecham, the majority could find no good reason to depart from such clearly
36 See 7 PHLip E. AREEDA, ANTrRusr LAW 1501 (1986) ('In 1897 application of
Sherman Act § 1 seemed deceptively simple. Once a 'contract combination or conspiracy'
affecting interstate commerce appeared, the statute made 'every' restraint a crime.").
37 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
38 See id at 292-98.
39 See id at 309.
40 See id at 27-28. The common law originally refused to enforce contracts that were a
restraint on trade, finding such contracts to be against public policy. However, by the eighteenth
century, common law courts began to enforce contracts in restraint of trade, so long as the
restraint was ancillary to a lawful business purpose and limited in time and space. See 7
AREEDA, supra note 36, 1501 (citing Mitchel v. Reynolds, I P. Wins. 181 (K.B. 1711)). As
time progressed, a contract in restraint of trade was enforceable so long as it was reasonable,
where reasonableness was presumed. By 1890, the common law rule against contracts in
restraint of trade was largely nonexistent. See id.
41 See Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 327-28.
42 See id at 312 ('The language of the act includes every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States or with foreign nations."); see also MILTON HANDLER, ANTrTRUST IN PERSPECIVE 5
(' To Peckham [author of the majority opinion], the only question in Sherman Act litigation was
whether the challenged arrangement constituted a restraint of trade; if so, it fell within the
statutory condemnation.").
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written language noting: 'TIhat impolicy [sic] is not so clear, nor are the reasons
for the exception so potent as to permit us to interpolate an exception into the
language of the act, and to thus materially alter its meaning and effect."43 Because
the Trans-Missouri railroads activity involved an agreement and because the
agreement resulted in a restraint upon trade, the Supreme Court found the
agreement to be illegal, without any investigation into the reasonableness of the
agreement. 4
Four dissenting Justices disagreed with this approach, arguing that the
Sherman Act should be read in light of the common law tradition that only
contracts creating unreasonable trade restraints were to be found illegal 45
Because the prices agreed upon by Trans-Missouri were reasonable prices, the
dissent asserted that the restraint upon trade was a reasonable one, and thus legal
under the Sherman Act.4 6
According to a majority of the Trans-Missouri Justices, an investigation into
the reasonableness of the restraints caused by particular agreements was not
necessary in Section I Sherman Act cases. Rather, the majority preferred to make
a literal interpretation of statutory language which very clearly seemed to forbid
all agreements in restraint of trade. However, it was not long before the courts
began to realize that some sort of reasonableness standard was necessary in
applying Section 1.
43 Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 340.
44 See id at 342 ("Mhe [antitrust] suit of the Government can be maintained without
proof of the allegation that the agreement was entered into for the purpose of restraining trade or
commerce or for maintaining rates above what was reasonable.").
45 See id. at 346 (White, J. dissenting):
Is it correct to say that at common law the words "restraint of trade" had a generic
signification which embraced all contracts which restrained the freedom of trade, whether
reasonable or unreasonable, and, therefore, that all such contracts are within the meaning
of the words "every contract in restraint of trade"? I think a brief consideration of the
history and development of the law on the subject will not only establish the inaccuracy of
this proposition, but also demonstrate that the words "restraint of trade" embrace only
contracts which unreasonably restrain trade, and, therefore, that reasonable contracts,
although they, in some measure, "restrain trade," are not within the meaning of the words.
Id; see also HANDLER, supra note 42, at 5 ("[A]ccording to White's theory, the rule of reason
had been built into the very words and structure of the legislation."). It is important to note that,
even under a modem application of the Sherman Act employing the rule of reason, the tacit
price agreement by the railroad association would still represent a per se violation of Section 1.
See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (holding that the per se
rule against price-fixing applies to agreements by horizontal competitors to fix prices).
46 See Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 370 (White, J., dissenting) ("It seems to me very clear
that that the contract in question is in accord with the [Sherman Act] and should not be
avoided.").
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C. Development of the Rule ofReason
1. Movement Towards Applying Section 1 Only to "Unreasonable
Restraints "
Not long after Trans-Missouri was decided, it began to become clear that a
literal interpretation of Section 1 would not work. Nearly every business
agreement, no matter how minor or inconsequential, restrains trade in some
way.47 Under a literal interpretation of Section 1, such agreements would be
illegal. Surely the Sherman Act was not designed to prohibit such agreements,
which posed a minimal threat to commerce and actually promoted legitimate and
useful business objectives.
The Supreme Court hinted as much, in the 1898 case, United States v. Joint-
Traffic Association.48 In Joint Traffic Association, thirty-one competing railroads
had formed an association in order to cooperate with each other in developing
reasonable rates and fares.49 Once again a majority of the Justices found the
association illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act without looldng into the
reasonableness of the anangement.50 However, the majority also suggested in
dictum that some restraints might not fall under the control of Section 1. The
Court noted that the Sherman Act might not apply to common and useful business
practices which restrained trade: "An agreement entered into for the purpose of
promoting the legitimate business of an individual or corporation, with no
purpose to thereby affect or restrain interstate commerce, is not, as we think,
covered by the act, although the agreement may indirectly and remotely affect
that commerce." 51 The Court affirmed its willingness to find some restraints as
exempted from the Sherman Act in the 1898 case, Hopkins v. United States.52 In
its opinion, the majority noted that Section 1 could not be construed to apply to
every business arrangement, or else "there would scarcely be an agreement
among businessmen that could not be said to have, indirectly or remotely, some
bearing upon interstate commerce and, possibly to restrain it.' '53 The Court found
4 7 See supra note 3.
48 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
4 9 See id at 505-09.
50 See id at 505 (stating that the same result should be reached in this case as in Trans-
Missour); see also GIFFORD & RASKIND, supra note 17, at 39 (concluding that in Joint Traffic
Association, "the Supreme Court construed the [Sherman] Act literally to prohibit concerted
'restraint[s] of trade,' regardless of their reasonableness.").
51 Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. at 568; see also 7 AREEDA, supra note 36, 1501
(commenting that the Joint Traffic Association opinion indicates that "the Court began to doubt
that Congress meant to reach every minor restraine).
52 171 U.S. 578 (1898).
53 Id at 600; see also Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. at 568 (repeating the same
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the agreement in question to be legal in Hopkins, based upon the fact that the
agreement's affect upon commerce was indirect.54
Despite some indications that the Supreme Court was willing to apply some
sort of reasonableness standard to Section 1 cases, through 1898 the Court had yet
to fully embrace such a standard. In Joint Traffic Association, the Court had re-
affirmed its holding in Trans-Missouri, while the reasoning in Hopkins was "far
from clear."55 It would be over a decade before the United States Supreme Court
accepted completely a reasonableness standard for some Section 1 cases.
2. Establishment of the Rule ofReason
The use of a reasonableness standard for adjudicating certain business
conduct under the Sherman Act was first articulated 56 by the Supreme Court in
two cases: Standard Oil Co. v. United States57 and United States v. American
Tobacco Co.58 In Standard Oil, the Court once again noted that the language of
Section 1 was very broad, expansive enough to "embrace every conceivable
contract or combination."59 The Court rejected such a broad interpretation,
instead holding that the proper method of adjudication of Sherman Act cases was
the use of a "standard of reason" of a type used in the common law.60 In
American Tobacco, the Court'articulated similar reasoning, noting: "The Anti-
trust Act must have a reasonable construction as there can scarcely be any
agreement or contract among business men that does not directly or indirectly
affect and possibly restrain commerce."6 1
With its Standard Oil and American Tobacco opinions, the Supreme Court
fully embraced the idea that some sort of reasonableness standard was the proper
language).
5 4 See id at 569 ("An agreement... which does not directly restrain such commerce, is
not... covered by the act; although the agreement may indirectly and remotely affect that
commerce").
55 7 AREEDA, supra note 36, 1501.
56 Lower courts, however, had adopted a reasonableness standard before the Supreme
Court did. In United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel, the Sixth Circuit employed a common
law standard of reasonableness into its opinion, arguing that an agreement could be found
reasonable if it was ancillary to an agreement with a legitimate business purpose. 85 F. 271,282
(6th Cir. 1898), aft'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
57 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
58 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
59 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60.
60 Id at 60 ("[Tjhe standard of reasonableness which had been applied at the common law
and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by the statute, was
intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether in a given case a
particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which the statute provided.").
61 American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 107.
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standard in adjudicating some Section 1 cases. However, questions about the
application of the rule of reason still remained. Specifically, there was the
question of how this reasonableness standard was to be applied.62 Standard Oil
suggested that the common law standard should be used to establish
reasonableness. 63 Was this the proper standard? Or should the standard of
reasonableness be developed through other means? It was not long before the
Supreme Court developed what has become the generally accepted construction
of the rule of reason.
3. Application of the Rule ofReason
In Standard Oil and American Tobacco, the Supreme Court cemented the
idea that at least some agreements would not be found automatically in violation
of the Sherman Act, but would now be evaluated under some sort of
reasonableness standard. The next question became how this reasonableness
standard was going to be applied.
After refusing to adopt common law standards of whether or not a particular
agreement was reasonable,64 courts utilizing the rule of reason have focused their
evaluations upon a particular agreement's competitive impact.65 This focus upon
competitive impact is illustrated in the 1918 case, Chicago Board of Trade v.
62 See HANDLER, supra note 42, at 9 (noting that Justice White, in trying to get the rule of
reason into antitrust jurisprudence, was "more concerned with having it [the rule of reason]
recognized than in defining its contene).
63 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
64 Although the Sherman Act was drafted using restraint of trade language used by the
common law, the common law standard of reasonableness has not been found to be the
standard employed by courts. See 7 AREEDA, supra note 36, 1501 ("Decisions under the
Sherman Act have left the common law rulings far behind.:). Areeda asserts that the common
law served only as a starting point from which judges could assert their own standards of
reasonableness:
In my view, the use of unelaborated common law words and references simply
invested the federal courts with a newjurisdiction that inevitably required them to receive,
apply, and develop the common law in the same way that a new jurisdiction customarily
does-that is, to use certain customary techniques of judicial reasoning, to consider the
reasoning and results of common law courts, and to develop, refine, and innovate in the
dynamic common law tradition ... the antitrust courts routinely find unlawful restraints of
trade where the common law would not have imagined.
Id
65 See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 n.14
(1984) (stating that the law protects competition, not individual competitors); Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,488 (1977) (same).
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United States t6 -a case that contains the "formulation most often quoted to
express the inquiry mandated by Sherman Act § 1."67 The Supreme Court was
asked to determine the legality of the Board of Trade's "Call Rule," which
required grain traders dealing after the close of public trading to buy and sell only
at the price at which the market had closed.63 In its opinion, the Supreme Court
focused upon the economic effects of the agreement, noting that "the true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promoted competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition."69 The Court went on to explain more fully how to evaluate
a particular agreement's effect upon competition, holding that one must make
three evaluations: (a) the level of competitive harm resulting from the defendant's
activities; (b) the existence of a legitimate and useful purpose behind the activities
of the participant, and (c) if there was a legitimate purpose behind the activity, the
existence of another, less restrictive means to advance the legitimate and useful
purpose behind the participants activities.70 These three evaluations are made by
"virtually all courts" when applying the rule of reason.71
In evaluating competitive harm, courts typically make two separate
examinations. First, courts examine whether competition is harmed by a
particular agreement.72 Second, courts examine the extent of this hann. 3 In
evaluating the existence of competitive harm, a deviation in prices and output
from the competitive level is generally a strong indication of anticompetitive
affect.74 In a rule of reason case, this economic effect is nearly impossible to
prove, because it is often impossible to establish what the competitive level
66 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
67 7 AREEDA, supra note 36, 1502.
68 Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 232-33.
69 Id at 238.
70 Te Chicago Board of Trade's articulation of this rule is a follows:
[Tihe court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint
is applied, its condition before and after the restraint... and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id.
71 See 7 AREEDA, supra note 36, 1502.
72 See 7 AREEDA, supra note 36, 1503 ("[W]e must go on to determine not only whether
that harm is not only possible but likely and significant.'); Areeda, supra note 3, at 573-74.
73 See supra note 72..
74 See NCAA v. Board of Regents of The Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984)
(noting that the NCAA's plan works to raise prices and restrict output, which operates as a
"hallmark [ ] of anticompetitve behavior"); see also Areeda, supra note 3, at 576 (noting that
the most recent antitrust cases require an "actual or potential impairment of price and outpuf').
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should be in the first place,75 let alone that output and prices are differing from
that competitive level.76 Additionally, many business arangements are evaluated
under the antitrust laws before they actually began to produce anticompetitive
results 77
In evaluating the extent of competitive harm, a-determination is usually made
of the defendant's share of the relevant market. The higher the firm's share of the
market, the greater the extent of harm to competition,78 because a firm with high
75 According to microeconomic theory, in a perfectly competitive market, price equals
marginal cost. See, e.g., KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS, 211
(4th ed. 1996). Therefore, one approach is to assume that a product's marginal cost is its
competitive price level. See Michael S. McFalls, The Role and Assessment of Classical Market
Power in Joint Venture Analysis, 66 ANTrRUST 651, 654 (1998). There are two problems with
this approach. First, calculating marginal costs itself is often a difficult process. See McFalls
supra, at 655 (noting the difficulty in calculating a firm's marginal costs at any given time); see
also Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 ofthe Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697,716-18 (1975) (allowing average costs to
be substituted for marginal costs because of the difficulty in calculating marginal costs).
Second, it is uncertain whether or not the perfectly competitive market is a realistic model for
how the marketplace actually works. If it is not, then firms in a competitive market may charge
prices that deviate from marginal costs. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Imperfect Information in
the Product Market, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRiAL ORGANIZATION 769, 818 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (asserting that if one of the assumptions of the
perfectly competitive market-perfect information-is eliminated, then firms would be able to
charge more than marginal cost, even where competition is robust). The same difficulties exist
in calculating competitive output levels. Even if a competitive output level could be calculated
under the traditional assumptions of the competitive market, there is no guarantee that these
assumptions are correct. See supra notes 28-33.
76 See McFalls, supra note 75 at 658 ("Even when relevant [output and price] data are
available, interpretation may be difficult"). McFalls asserts that it is very difficult to tie a
particular price increase to a particular business practice: "Prices may increase for reasons
completely unrelated to the practice or transaction under review. Conversely, prices may have
decreased during the relevant period, but they might have been even lower in the absence of the
conduct at issue." Id
7 7 See, e.g., 7 AREEDA, supra note 36, 1503 ("Many alleged restraints are examined
before they have had time to work their results.").
7 8 See Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that in
order to show competitive harm, an antitrust plaintiffimust delineate a relevant market and show
that the defendant plays enough of a role in that market to impair competition significantly);
United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980); Ginzburg, M.D. v.
Memorial Healthcare Sys., 993 F. Supp. 998, 1025-26 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that plaintiff
could not prevail under the rule of reason because she had not established that defendant had
market power); see also Areeda, supra note 3, at 576 (noting that "the usual way" to determine
magnitude of competitive harm is to establish the defendant's market share). Areeda notes that
there are two instances where an evaluation of market power need not be made. First, an
examination of market power is not necessary where a substantial, adverse economic effect has
already been established. For instance, where it is proved that a defendant's actions have caused
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market power will be better able to raise prices and extract monopoly profits at
the expense of consumers.7 9 In some cases, market power might be relatively
easy to establish. In other cases, market power might only to be established
through protracted litigation and analysis of complex economic data.80
In establishing a legitimate business justification for the defendant's
activities, courts will focus upon the actual economic effects of the actions, rather
than the defendant's good intentions.81 Further, courts have suggested that while
a particular activity might have a beneficial, noneconomic justification, only a
justification creating economic benefits will be considered for Section 1
purposes.82 In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,83 the
Society of Engineers defended its price controls by arguing that such restraints
were necessary in order to avoid cost-cutting engineering which might endanger
consumers' health and safety.84 The Supreme Court rejected such a defense,
stating that one is not to look atthe public interest served by an activity, but only
prices to rise dramatically, then there is no need to establish market power. See id. at 577-78.
Second, an investigation into market power is not necessary where the defendant has failed to
establish any sort of legitimate justification for his or her actions. It has been suggested by the
courts that such a "naked restraint" will be condemned without any investigation into market
power. See id (discussing Indiana Fed'n of Dentists v. FTC, 745 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1984)).
79 Ifa firm has a high share of the market, and if it used its market power to charge higher
prices, then it would successfully be able to do so-at least until new entrants into the market
are able to undersell the monopolist. See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text. However,
a firm with little market power represents no threat to competition, because if it tried to charge
monopoly prices, then those comprising the other 90% of the market could easily step in and
undersell the firm. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 20 (1984) ("Firms that lack power
cannot injure competition no matter how hard they try.").
80 See infra notes 171-82 and accompanying text.
81 Courts have often disregarded the defendants' intentions. See, e.g., United States v.
Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 335 (1969) (holding that an agreement to exchange
price information to be unreasonable regardless of the defendant's intent); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75 (1911) (creating a presumption that antitrust defendant had the
intent to monopolize the oil industry, even without evidence of that specific intent); see also 7
AREEDA, supra note 36, 1504 ("[Tjhe defendants' state of mind is less important for antitrust
policy than the objective consequences of their behavior.").
82 See, eg., Law v. NCAA, 134 F3d 1010, 1021 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Justifications offered
under the rule of reason may be considered only to the extent that they tend to show that, on
balance, 'the challenged restraint enhances competition.") (quoting NCAA v. Board of
Regents for Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984)); United States v. Realty Multi-List,
629 F.2d 1351, 1370 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that the rule ofreason looks only at the competitive
significance of the restraint involved); United States v. Delta Dental of Rhode Island, 943 F.
Supp. 172, 186 (D. RI., 1996) (holding that an examination under the rule of reason entails,
among other things, an investigation of the legitimate economic justifications for the business
practice).
83 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
84 See id at 693-94.
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whether or not it increases competition.85 However, in many cases a
noneconomic justification for a particular activity can be phrased so that it
becomes an economic justification.86 Even where a defendant is able to establish
a legitimate, economic justification for his or her activities, the activities may still
be declared illegal if the plaintiff can establish that the same economic effect
could be obtained through less restrictive means.87
Typically, in a rule of reason case the burden of proof will shift several times
between the plaintiff and the defendant.88 First, the plaintiff must allege that
competition in some market has been restrained, and then present some evidence
to support that allegation in order to avoid summary judgment.89 If the evidence
establishes a restraint, then the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that
there is a legitimate business justification for the behavior.90 Any established
85 See id at 695-96.
86 The courts are reluctant to pay credence to noneconomic justifications for particular
activities. See supra notes 81-84, and accompanying text However, many apparently
noneconomic justifications can be characterized as economic given proper phrasing. For
instance, Professor Areeda discusses an example where three television networks agree to
devote two nonoverlapping hours weekly to cultural programming. Initially, the elevation of
cultural awareness might seem like a noneconomic, nonlegitimate goal. However, the
arrangement might be characterized as a means of satisfying consumers who prefer cultural
programming. At the same time, those who prefer noncultural programming are still satisfied,
because at any given time they can view non-cultural programming on the other two networks.
See 7 AREEDA, supra note 36, 1504 ("[M]any claims of redeeming virtue expressed by
laymen in public interest terms can be reformulated in terms of promoting competition.); see
also Albert A. Foer, The Political-Economic Nature of Antitrust, 27 ST. Louis U. L.J. 331, 338
('The information necessary to defeat a reasonableness defense usually is very difficult to
obtain, it is expensive to obtain, and generally there is enough of abasis on which to show some
business rationale that the plaintiff has a very hard and lengthy fight").87 Professor Areeda asserts that determining whether or not a less restrictive means exists
is actually a "two-part inquiry." See 7 AREEDA, supra note 36, 1505. First, the court must
determine whether the restraint actually serves the stated objective. Even where a defendant has
established a legitimate justification, the particular restraint might not do much to advance that
justification. For instance, where a realty listing company imposes a $1,000 fee upon new
members in order to cover capital and operating expenses, the fee is not related to a legitimate
justification where the company's capital and operating expenses are virtually nothing. See
Areeda, supra note 3, at 580 (discussing United States v. Realty Multi-List, 629 F2d 1351,
1370 (5th Cir. 1980)). The second inquiry is whether or not the same objective could be reached
through less restrictive means. See id. at 581.88 See, e.g., K.M.B. Warehouse Distrib., Inc. and KMB/CT Inc., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir.
1995) (detailing the three-step process of the rule ofreason);Addamax Corp. v. Open Software
Found., 888 F. Supp. 274,283 (D. Mass. 1995) (same).
89 See supra note 88; see also 7 AREEDA, supra note 36, 1502 ('To avoid adverse
summary judgment, he [plaintiff] must show that there are disputed material facts on that
question of [competitive harm].").
90 See supra note 89; see also supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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justification, however, can be challenged if the plaintiff can establish that there is
a less restrictive means to accomplish that objective.91
4. The Rule ofReason in Conjunction with the Per Se Rule
Under its Standard Oil and American Tobacco decisions, the Supreme Court
had fully embraced the idea that some agreements were to be evaluated under
Section 1 by a reasonableness standard. However, this reasonableness standard
still had to be reconciled with previous court decisions, such as Trans-Missouri,
which held all agreements in restraint of trade to be illegal.92 As a result, antitrust
adjudication has developed the per se/rule of reason dichotomy.
Under Section 1, the courts have placed business practices into two
categories. In one category were placed the agreements thought to be so plainly
anticompetitive as to be per se illegal.93 Generally, in evaluating Section 1 cases,
the courts have identified certain types of agreements which fall into the per se
categorization. 94 Some examples of the types of agreements thought to be per se
illegal are any horizontal agreements among competitors to fix prices95 and
territorial allocations, where competitors agree to divide the markets among
themselves.96 Sometimes a court will find a particular agreement previously
91 See supra note 90.
92 See GIFFORD & RASKIND, supra note 17, at 40 (discussing the Supreme Court's attempt
to reconcile the rule of reason "with earlier decisions which had applied the § 1 prohibition
literally).
93 The Fifth Circuit explained that:
The probability that anticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the
severity of those consequences must be balanced against its pro-competitive consequences.
Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but aper se rule reflects the judgment
that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense
necessary to identify them.
United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1365 (5th Cir. 1980); see also
Northwest Wholesale Stationers Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 298
(1985) ("A plaintiff seeking application oftheper se rule must present a threshold case that the
challenged activity falls into a category likely to have predominantly anticompetitive effects').
94 For a discussion of the categories of agreements held by the courts to fall under the per
se rule, see Gladieux, supra note 1, at 480-87; see also GIFFORD & RASKIND, supra note 17, at
37-270.
95 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) ("[A]
combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging,
or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.").
96 See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1990) (per curium)
(declaring unlawful on its face an agreement between bar review courses and sales companies
to only sell in certain areas).
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thought to be per se illegal to fall under the rule of reason.97 Some types of
agreements, such as tying arrangements and group boycotts, may be adjudicated
under either the per se rule or the rule of reason, depending upon an initial
examination of the agreement 98 Even where an agreement is found to fall into the
per se categorization, if the antitrust plaintiff is able to establish a procompetitive
justification for his actions, then the agreement will be adjudicated under the rule
of reason.99 Such an approach is known as the "quick-look' rule of reason.100
97 An example of this is vertical, nonprice agreements, where a supplier agrees with a
retailer somewhere down the distribution chain to restrain something other than price. Such
agreements were once found to be per se illegal. See United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co,
388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967) (holding that "where a manufacturer sells products to his distributor
subject to territorial restrictions upon resale, a per se violation of the Sherman Act results.").
Subsequently, the Court reversed itself, holding that such agreements were to fall under the rule
of reason. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977) (holding
that the per se rule does not apply to vertical, nonprice restraints).
98 A tying arrangement exists where the seller conditions the sale of one product (the tying
product) upon the purchase of another product (the tied product). Tying arrangements were
originally thought to be anticompetitive, based upon the theory that the seller was using market
power in the tying product to force consumers to buy the tied product This was known as
leverage theory. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611
(1953) ("[Tjhe essence of illegality in tying agreements is the wielding of monopolistic
leverage; a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the
next"). However, leverage theory came under serious scrutiny, as commentators questioned
whether or not a consumer could be forced into buying two tied products at a price that was
higher than the amount that the consumer valued the two products. See generally Ward S.
Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J 19 (1957). As a
result, courts have found tying arrangements to be per se illegal only where certain preliminary
factors have been established. These factors are: (a) market power in the tying product; (b) the
existence of two separate products; (c) actual coercion of consumers; (d) a substantial effect
upon interstate commerce. See generally Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2
(1984).
Group boycotts, where a firm restricts output, or decreases the supply of available goods
on the marketplace, is another type of activity once thought to be per se illegal. See, e.g., Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 210-14 (1957) (holding an agreement
between electronics manufacturers not to supply a particular store as illegal under Section 1).
However, subsequent decisions have suggested that a court may look for market power before
condemning a particular boycott. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S.
411, 438 (1990) (Brennen, J., dissenting and concurring) (noting that "there could be no
antitrust violation absent a showing that the boycotted possessed some degree of market
power....').
9 9 See, e.g., BMI v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1979) (finding a price
fixing agreement to fall under the rule of reason because the agreement actually helped promote
competition). Courts are also reluctant to apply the per se rule where the agreement, although
falling into the per se categorization, is necessary for there even to be a product in the first place.
See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 117-20 (1984)
(applying rule of reason to a price-fixing arrangement because the arrangement was necessary
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Once an agreement is found to fall under the per se rule, it is declared to be
automatically illegal, usually without additional investigation into its economic
impact.' 0 'Any agreement not found to fit into any of the per se categories is
evaluated under the rule of reason. Under the rule of reason, the economic impact
of these agreements would be determined using the factors and criteria articulated
in Chicago Board of Trade.102 As noted above, this investigation requires
detailed investigation into an agreement's economic impact, its procompetitive
justifications, and the existence of less restrictive altematives.103
The per se rule is perceived as a short-cut, where an antitrust plaintiff will be
able to establish an antitrust violation without the legal and factual inquiries that
are required in rule of reason adjudication.10 4 As a result, there will often be
heated, preliminary litigation just in establishing whether a case should be
adjudicated under the per se rule or the rule of reason.105 While the antitrust
to have intercollegiate athletics in the first place). Courts are also reluctant to apply the per se
rule where the arrangement involves professional association rules. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana
Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) ("[W]e have been slow to condenm rules adopted by
professional associations as unreasonable per se... .7).
100 See, e.g., Jay N. Fastow, Does the Per Se Rule in Antitrust Law Remain Viable? The
U.S. Supreme Court Has Oscillated in Its Own Application of the Doctrine, Creating Some
Uncertainty, NAT'L LJ., July 27, 1998, at B4 (noting that the "quick-look" rule of reason
examines a defendant's procompetitive justifications to determine whether a full rule of reason
analysis is necessary).
101 See Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958):
[Ihere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se unreasonableness
not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more
certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an
incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the
industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a
particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when
undertaken.
Id.; see also GIFFORD & RASKIND, supra note 17, at 40 (noting that in a price-fixing agreement,
"the plaintiffneed only prove an agreement among competitors about price").
102 See supra notes 66-91 and accompanying text.
103 See id
104 In addition to making for an easier trial, conventional wisdom suggests that the
antitrust plaintiff's only chance of winning might lie under aper se rule. See infra part II.C.5.
105 Gifford and Raskind make this point:
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plaintiff tries to show that the agreement falls into one of the per se
categorizations, the antitrust defendant is trying to show that it does not.106 Even
where it is clear that the arrangement in question belongs to the per se
categorization, considerable litigation will often occur at the preliminary stage as
the defendant attempts to establish some procompetitive justification that would
warrant analysis under the rule of reason.107 The extensive nature of this
preliminary litigation is well warranted. As will be discussed below, a court's
preliminary classification of a particular agreement will often determine the
outcome of the case.
5. The Result Today-Per Se Legality
As first articulated in Chicago Board of Trade, the rule of reason analysis
should require a careful examination of both the positive and negative
competitive effects posed by a specific agreement. In reality, however, under rule
of reason analysis, the agreement under scrutiny is almost never declared
Because the per se approach is designed to be a short-cut method for reaching similar
overall results which would be reached under the rule of reason, tension between the two
rules arises in those cases in which a plaintiff would be able to prove its case under theper
se rule but would not be able to prove a case under the rule of reason.
GIFFORD & RASKIND, supra note 17, at 40.
106 There are some close cases as to whether or not a particular agreement deserves to fall
into a per se category. See, eg., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)
(discussing the identity of a certain arrangement under Section 1 of the Sherman Act). A major
issue of the case was whether the arrangement was a vertical price arrangement, and therefore
per se illegal, or a vertical non-price agreement, which would fall under the rule of reason. See
id. at 760-65.
One determination which might make or break an antitrust case is whether a particular
arrangement is horizontal or vertical. A particular arrangement may be per se illegal ifjudged to
be horizontal, but may fall under the rule of reason if found to be vertical in nature. See Val D.
Ricks, Seeing the Diagonal Clearly: Telling Vertical from Horizontal in Antitrust Law, 28 U.
TOL. L. REv. 151, 151-55 (1996). Recently, some courts have become confused as to whether
a particular arrangement is horizontal or vertical. See generally Discon, Inc. v. Nynex Corp., 93
F.3d 1055 (2d Cir. 1996),judgment vacated, 525 U.S. 1019 (1998). In Discon, the Second
Circuit characterized a particular arrangement as a "two-firm group boycott," which is a
horizontal arrangement, rather than as an exclusive dealings contract, which is "essentially
vertical in nature." Id. at 1060-61. Commentators have suggested that the Second Circuit's
characterization has the potential of "condemning potentially reasonable exclusive dealerships
as per se illegal group boycotts without adequate (or any) consideration of possible
procompetitive justifications." Deborah A. Widiss, Note, Uneasy Labeling, 107 YALE LJ.
1529, 1534 (1998). The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Second Circuit, holding that the
arrangement could not be properly characterized as a "group-boycott." Nynex Corp. v. Discon,
Inc., 119 S. Ct. 493,497 (1998).
107 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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illegal.108 The reason for this overwhelming disparity is not necessarily because
the antitrust plaintiff is always right on the merits. The rule of reason is set up in
such a way so that even meritorious claims have little chance of winning. There
are several reasons why an antitrust plaintiff will have a particularly hard time
winning a Section 1 rule of reason case.
First, in a rule of reason situation, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of
establishing competitive harm.109 Generally this means establishing that the price
and supply of goods on the market is different from the levels that would be
offered in a competitive market.110 As noted above, due to lag effects111 and
108 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaldng Tasks, 76 GEo.
W. 305, 305 (1987) (declaring that adjudication under the rule of reason "as a practical matter
meant that they were declared lawful per se!); Foer, supra note 84, at 337-38 ("With only
slight exaggeration, there is really only one thing one needs to know about the rule of reason:
when the rule is applied, the defendant virtually always wins.'); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.,
Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L.
REV. 685, 685 (1991); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach:
Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CH. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977) ("[Ihe content of the
Rule of Reason is largely unknown; in practice, it is little more than a euphemism for
nonliability.'); Widiss, supra note 106, at 1529 ("In theory, rule-of-reason analysis requires a
careful examination of the competitive impact of a specific agreement; in practice, however, the
challenged agreement is rarely struck down.'). The courts have also acknowledged the practical
result of rule of reason cases. See, eg., Discon, Inc. v. Nynex Corp., 93 F.3d 1055 (2d Cir.
1996) decision vacated Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 493, 497 (1998) ("[T]he initial
categorization is often outcome determinative").
Admittedly, the idea that defendants will rarely be found liable under the rule of reason is
merely representative of conventional antitrust wisdom and not the product of empirical data. A
reasonable question to ask is why anyone would even bring a rule of reason antitrust suit, if one
was certain to lose? An answer to that question may be found in a recent empirical study
detailing the success rate of claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act See
generally Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999). Colker's study concludes that 84% of ADA claims
brought on appeal resulted in a victory for the defendant See id at 107. Colker then asks the
question: Why do plaintiffs bring appeals at all if they know that there is a strong probability
that they will lose? See id at 109. Several of her answers translate well into an antitrust context:
(a) lawyers may not be aware of the statistics involved in the specific type of case; and (b)
lawyers may feel that the case they are litigating is different from previous cases. See id. at 110.
Another explanation may lie in the fact that an antitrust suit will impose substantial litigation
costs upon an antitrust plaintiff, regardless of outcome. Competitors might view antitrust suits
as an opportunity to inflict enormous economic damage upon a rival, regardless of the outcome
of the actual suit See generally Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the
Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REv. 551 (1991) (concluding that very
few antitrust suits brought by competitors are meritorious).
10 9 See supra notes 70-78, 89 and accompanying text.
I 10 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
I I 1 See supra note 77 and accompanying text
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difficulties in establishing competitive levels in the first place, 12 this situation is
nearly impossible to establish, even where the claim itself might be
meritorious.113 Furthermore, even where the plaintiff is able to establish
deviations of supply from the competitive level, the plaintiff will still lose if the
defendant can produce some legitimate business rationale for its behavior.114 In
many cases, a defendant will be able to establish some justification for its
actions.' 15 Even when a plaintiff is capable of establishing competitive harm in
the absence of a competitive justification, it will in all but a few cases be at a
tremendous expense.1 16 Due to the length and complexity of an antitrust suit the
legal fees required in a rule of reason suit would be immense. 17 Rule of reason
adjudication requires complex analysis of economic data and extensive discovery
such an analysis and discovery will be extremely costly, completely independent
of attorney's fees.1 18 Therefore, the information required to win a rule of reason
112 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
113 There are numerous cases where an antitrust claim is dismissed, purely because one
side was unable to present any evidence of adverse economic effect. See, e.g., Cascade Cabinet
Co. v. Western Cabinet & Millwork, Inc., 710 F.2d 1366, 1373 (9th Cir. 1983) (aflrming
summary judgment on a rule of reason claim because Cascade had failed to present any
evidence of injury to competition); Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 887 (9th Cir.
1982) ("[W]hile appellants point to injury to their particular business, they do not make the
necessary showing of a substantially adverse effect on competition in the record market in
general.'); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 812 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that the
plaintiffs had failed to produce independent data indicating competitive harm). But see J.F.
Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1539 (3rd Cir. 1990) (holding that the
plaintiff had presented adequate evidence of economic harm); see also GIFFORD & RASKIND,
supra note 17, at 40 ("As the cases indicate, an unreasonable restraint is one in which the supply
of goods on the market is limited to levels below those which would be offered in a competitive
market. In many situations it is difficult or impossible for a plaintiff to prove this market
effect."); Piraino, supra note 108, at 702 (noting that under the rule of reason, "[p]laintiffs will
find it increasingly difficult to prove the requisite anticompetitive effect necessary to prevail at
trial').
1 14 Seesupra notes 81-87,90 and accompanying text.
115 Establishing aprocompetitive justification might be easier than one realizes. See supra
note 86 and accompanying text.
116 See Foer, supra note 86, at 338.
117 In 1986, it is estimated that antitrust cases consumed $250 million a year in legal fees
alone. See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust
Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J 1001, 1016 (1986). The Justice Department has disclosed that its suit
against Microsoft has cost $13.3 million. See Justice Department Spent $13.3 Million on its
Microsoft Case, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1999, at B6, available in 1999 WL-WSJ 24916878
[hereinafter Justice Department].
118 See Mark Crane, The Future Direction ofAntitrust, 56 AN=rrRUST 3, 16-17 ("The rule
of reason requires documents from third parties, expert testimony, and statistical data as well.
The result is not only a longer trial but substantially increased discovery and pretrial expense.").
In 1980, it was estimated that antitrust suits cost a total of $2 billion. See Robert R. Reich, The
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antitrust suit will be both difficult and expensive to obtain.
Second, the expense of an antitrust trial is likely to adversely affect the
antitrust plaintiff in other ways unrelated to the merits of the case. The extensive
costs might impose a substantial burden upon a private antitrust plaintiff, who
might have limited resources to bring this lawsuit. 19 Given such a heavy
financial burden, a well-funded antitrust defendant will be more likely to win the
case simply by exhausting the plaintiff through endless discovery and other
tactics. 120
Third, a court's decision to adjudicate a case under the rule of reason might
diminish an antirust plaintiff's incentive to even bring the lawsuit.121 When a
lawyer is advising a client whether or not to bring an antitrust case, he is
concerned about two things: the costs of carrying the case and the potential award
if the case is won.122 If costs are in excess of the potential award, then the
plaintiff's lawyer can be expected to not bring suit.123 A determination that a
particular case will be brought under the rule of reason will have two effects.
Antitrustlndustry, 68 GEO. LJ. 1053, 1068 (1980).
119 Presumably, the burden upon the federal government as an antitrust plaintiffwould not
be so high, since the government has access to far more financial resources than a typical
private plaintiff. See Kenny & Jordan, supra note 24, at 1371 ("The [Antitrust] division has
extraordinary one-way investigatory tools at its disposal prior to the filing of any lawsuit ... ').
However, one result of the tremendous costs associated with an antitrust suit is that the
government will have to expend its entire budget on one suit, with nothing left to bring other
suits. Still, despite these resources, the government plaintiff still must bear its burden of
establishing economic harm-not an easy thing to do. See, e.g., supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
120 See, e.g., RJ. Gerber, VIrctory vs. Truth: The Adversary System and Its Ethics, 19 ARIZ.
ST. L.L 3, 13 (1987) ("Many average litigants today are overdiscovered, overinterrogated,
overdeposed, and underqualified financially for all this attention. Discovery marathons readily
induce the parties to 'buy out' of litigation because discovery may well cost more than the value
of the claim.").
121 See Crane, supra note 118, at 15 (noting that it is hard to justify bringing a rule of
reason suit); Piraino, supra note 108, at 702-03 ("[Plaintiffs] will not want to risk the significant
costs ofa rule ofreason antitrust case on an uncertain outcome.'); Ricks, supra note 106, at 155
("Rule of reason cases are not often brought; they are too expensive to prosecute, especially
given the significant chance that the defendant might prevail.") (citations omitted).
122 The decision to bring a case can be expressed by balancing the expected value of filing
a claim (EVF) against the litigation costs of filing a claim (FC). See ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 339-40 (2d ed. 1997). Essentially, the EVF is determined
by multiplying one's probability of winning the case against the expected award. See id, at 339.
(This is a simplification. A more accurate model would also take into account the expected
benefits of bargaining to settle the case.) The FC represents legal fees, filing fees and
opportunity costs of filing and litigating the lawsuit See id Where FC exceeds EVF, one
should not continue with the lawsuit. Where EVF exceeds FC or is equal to FC, then one
should file the lawsuit See id at 340.
12 3 See id at 340.
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First, it will substantially decrease the plaintiffs chances of winning the suit,
given the high burden of proof placed upon plaintiffs under the rule of reason.124
Second, it will substantially enhance the costs of bringing suit.125 Therefore, an
antitrust case will raise the costs of bringing suit while reducing the potential
award-indicating that a rational plaintiff will not want to bring suit under the
rule of reason, even where he or she may have a meritorious claim.
Thus the expense and heavy burden of proof involved in a rule of reason
lawsuit make it difficult for an antitrust plaintiff to win a suit under the rule of
reason. However, this bias against defendants represents only one of the rule of
reason's several flaws.
III. THE FLAWED RULE OF REASON
A. Problems with the Rule ofReason
In theory, the rule of reason indicates that the approach was originally
intended to be an opportunity for courts to make a careful and close analysis of
questionable business practices. It was intended to provide courts with the
necessary flexibility to deal with constantly developing and changing business
practices. 126 In practice however, the rule has several notable flaws.
First, as noted above, an agreement producing an anticompetitive result will
still be found legal under the rule of reason: not because the agreement is legal on
the merits, but because of the heavy burden of proof and financial burden which
is placed upon the antitrust plaintiff'12 7 Second, the rule of reason is a
tremendously costly judicial device. Litigation and other trial expenses are likely
to be enormous.128 In addition, rule of reason adjudication may impose other
costs-the lost opportunity costs of business people forced to participate in the
rule of reason trial.129 As one commentator notes: 'Instead of spending their time
124 See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
12 5 See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
12 6 One commentator describes the rationale for the rule of reason as follows:
The courts want to render correct judgments. Since economic consequences are hard
to predict, the courts should consider all consequences of the allegedly illegal action before
condemning it. The result is a full scale rule of reason trial, complete with proof of market,
proof of market power, proof of economic effect and proof (by the defendant) of the
procompetitive aspects of its conduct. But, says the conventional wisdon, nothing less will
enable the courts to render ajust decision.
Crane, supra note 118, at 14.
127 See supra Part I.C.5.
128 See supra notes 116-18.
129 See Piraino, supra note 108, at 702.
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devising practical and creative solutions to competition problems, managers are
required to prepare for and attend depositions, assist in answering interrogatories,
and review voluminous pleadings."'1 30 Given the value of top-level employees to
their employers, these lost opportunity costs may be substantial. 31
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the rule of reason imposes upon
judges and juries complex economic issues and volumes of economic data which
they are incapable of comprehending so as to produce a rational result.132 While
typical cases require juries to decide basic factual issues such as "who did what,
when and why,"' 33 rule of reason cases require jurors to decide issues that go well
beyond the typical juror's experience, such as market power and competitive
impact.134 In a rule of reason trial, nearly every piece of evidence is relevant,
therefore such a trial will typically require juries and judges to sift through
enormous amounts of material.135 As one commentator notes: "If you do not
share this concern [about the ability of jurors to understand antitrust cases] I
recommend that you take a few moments to watch the videotape of the jury
deliberations at the rule of reason trial that formed part of our National Institute
130 Id.
131 See Curtis H. Barnette, The Importance of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Reducing
Litigation Costs as a Corporate Objective, 53 ANTTrRUST 277, 277 (1984) ("'Commercial
litigation takes business executives and their staffs away from the creative tasks of development
and production and often inflicts more wear and tear on them than the most difficult business
problems."') (quoting Chief Justice Burger).
132 Concerns about the ability of courts to handle complex litigation has troubled
commentators "throughout the history of the American judicial system?' See Development in
the Lav-The Civil Jwy: The Jury's Capacity to Decide Complex Civil Cases, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1489, 1489 (1997) (citations omitted) [hereinafter The Civil Jury]. These concerns became
especially acute when antitrust litigation was involved. See id. at 1490 ("Early debate about jury
performance in complex cases arose predominantly around antitrust litigation); Eric Kades,
The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Implications of Computational
Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403, 413 (1996) ("M]odem interest [in
complex litigation] was triggered in large part by the difficulties the federal courts were facing
with the increasingly larger antitrust suits that arose after World War IIV).
133 See Crane, supra note 118, at 15.
134 See, id at 15 (noting that juries are "ill-equipped" to understand the economic
information presented in an antitrust trial); Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 11 (noting that "it is
fantastic" to suppose that judges and juries could make the detailed factual inquiries necessary
in a rule of reason case). Professor Areeda seems to disagree with this view asserting that many
antitrust cases can be dismissed at the summary judgment stage without getting into the
complexity of a particular case. See 7 AREEDA, supra note 36, 1508.
135 See Kades, supra note 132 at 415 ('Parties can submit evidence on a wide range of
issues, and the judge and jury are left to sort out the factual mess"). A typical rule of reason
case will involve voluminous amounts of paperwork. The average antitrust case involves 70
docket entries, and includes a docket file eight inches thick. See Salop & White, supra note 117,
at 1009.
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last fall."136 The Court has recognized its own inability to deal with the
complexity of antitrust cases, noting that "courts are of limited utility in
examining difficult economic problems. '137 The result of this inability to deal
with economic data and economic theory, is a series of decisions that are neither
correct nor consistent.138
It might be argued that today's judges and clerks are far more familiar with
economic theory and are therefore capable of making the factual inquiries
necessary in a rule of reason case.139 However, the field of antitrust law is such
that no one, not even the most skilled economist, will be able to come up with a
consistent rational result. The field of economics is inherently uncertain. No one
is able to agree as to what economic model most closely represents reality, and
economists are in constant disagreement over economic policy. 140 As one
commentator writes:
[I]t is fantastic to suppose that judges and juries could make such an evaluation.
The welfare implications of most forms of business conduct are beyond our ken.
If we assembled twelve economists and gave them all the available data about a
business practice, plus an unlimited computer budget we would not get
agreement about whether the practice promoted consumers' welfare or economic
efficiency more broadly defined. They would discover some gaps in the
data .... Someone would invoke the principle of second best claiming that
monopoly could be a beneficial offset to distortions elsewhere. At least one of
the economists would construct a new model showing how the practice could
reduce efficiency if certain things (unknowable from the data) were present 14 1
One consequence of the irrational, inconsistent nature of antitrust law is that it
fails to provide with any certainty, a set of certain guidelines for businesses to
follow in complying with antitrust law.142 In order to avoid the huge litigation and
136 Crane, supra note 118, at 15.
137 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972) (citations omitted); see also
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,307-14 (1999).
138 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 3 ("Small wonder that the history of antitrust is
filled with decisions that now seem blunders.").
139 See Markovits, supra note 35, at 51 (noting the 'increasing economic sophistication of
the practicing antitrust bar, the Supreme Court clerks, and the Justices themselves"); Oliver E.
Williamson, Antitrust Enforcement: There It's Been, Jhere It's Going, 27 ST. LOUIS U. LJ.
289, 298-99 (1983) (arguing that in the 1970s, the Supreme Court began to use more
sophisticated economic analysis in their antitrust decisions).
140 See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
141 Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 11.
142 See Crane, supra note 118, at 16 ("[l]t is difficult-or perhaps impossible-for the
lawyer to reach an informed opinion as to the chances of success prior to filing suit").
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other costs associated with antitrust suits, 14 3 companies are going to want to
comply with antitrust law as much as possible while avoiding litigation. However,
a rule of reason case will produce inherently uncertain results. Because judges and
juries are ill-equipped to deal with the complex economic analysis necessary in
order to produce rational decisions under the rule of reason analysis, companies
(and the lawyers advising them) will often have a difficult time telling their clients
what types of behavior will result in litigation.144
Thus the rule of reason is flawed. It imposes substantial costs upon the
litigants, and it is so complex that it is nearly impossible to produce consistent
rational results. However, other areas of the law are also expensive and complex.
Securities litigation, patent law, and medical malpractice are all examples of
litigation that is at least as expensive and complex to administer as antitrust
law.145 However, antitrust law is distinguished from other areas of litigation by
the fact that the costs imposed by an erroneous antitrust decision will be far more
substantial than errors in other areas of the law.
For instance, consider litigation involving an alleged violation of rule
10(b)(5)'s prohibition against an insider trading on inside information. 146 If a
court were to erroneously condenm a certain stock deal because it violated
10(b)(5), the error will only have limited effect.147 Those accused of violating the
securities laws will be forbidden from performing a particular activity.
Additionally, other insiders similarly situated will be forbidden from performing
the same activities. Therefore, the costs of an erroneous decision will usually be
imposed upon a limited group of securities traders.148 In addition, while these
143 Although a firm will very likely avoid legal liability under rule of reason analysis, they
will still have to incur substantial legal costs in defending a rule of reason action. See
Easterbrook, supra note 108, at 305 (noting that the attorney's fees paid in defending a rule of
reason case were "a hefty tax on the lawful conduce').
144See Crane, supra note 118, at 16 ("Even more pernicious is the tendency for
aggressive businessmen to conclude that the rule of reason legitimizes any business conduct
that they can rationalize. Unless there is a case directly on point, it is virtually impossible to tell
a determined client that his proposed course of action will not pass muster under the rule of
reason when it seems perfectly reasonable to him.").
145 See generally The Civil Jury, supra note 132, at 1489.
146 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 780)(b) (1994) ("It shall be
unlawful.. to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."). The courts have held the
situation where an insider trades on inside, material information to be a violation of this statute.
See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
147 Assume perhaps, that the court had held the inside information to be material, when in
fact, it was not material in nature. The erroneous condemnation of an efficient practice is called
afalse positive. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Comparative Advantage andAntirust Law, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 983,985 (1987).
148 To be sure, there is a strong public interest in the outcome of securities litigation. The
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traders will have lost the benefits of a potential stock deal, in reality what is lost is
a potential transfer of wealthk-the condemned securities deal would not have
produced any efficiencies leading to a creation of wealth.149 The costs of an
erroneous antitrust decision, however, will be far more substantial. If a beneficial
economic activity is struck down as illegal under the Sherman Act the finm
responsible will be forbidden from performing that activity, as will all other
firms.15 0 Rather than just affecting a few individuals, an erroneous antitrust
decision might impact an entire industry.151 Unlike in securities litigation, the
condemned activity would not just effectuate a transfer of wealth, but would
create efficiencies for consumers which would actually create wealth.152 If many
other firms would have employed this efficient activity but for the erroneous
condemnation, then the foregone wealth creation could be substantial. 153
In summary, there are problems with the rule of reason-it is expensive and
uncertain. One consequence of these problems is that the antitrust defendant will
always win. Commentators have noticed these problems and many have proposed
securities laws were designed to protect the interests of all investors, not just the ones involved
in the litigation. See John R. Allison, Arbitration of Private Antitrust Claims in International
Trade: A Study in the Subordination of National Interests to the Demands of a World Market,
18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 361, 397-98 (noting that some types of litigation, such as
securities law and patent law, are not subject to private litigation because of the substantial
public interest in their outcome). However, this public interest comes into play only when a
particular securities sale is erroneously declared to be legal (a false negative). In the case of a
false negative in securities litigation, the entire investing public must bear the costs. On the
other hand, where a false positive is involved, it is only an isolated group of securities investors
who are prohibited from performing a certain activity.
149 Consider what happens in a sale of securities. A share of a corporation passes from one
individual to another. The benefits of the sale are enjoyed by the two individual traders, not by
the company. Out of the sale, the company receives no funds which might be used to develop
new technologies or create new efficient business practices. Therefore, the sale does nothing to
create new wealth by reducing a company's costs or increasing production. It is simply a
transfer of wealth between two private individuals.
150 See Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 2. ("If the court errs by condemning a beneficial
practice, the benefits may be lost for good. Any other firm that uses the condemned practice
faces sanctions in the name of stare decisis, no matter the benefits.").
151 In articulating the potential damages posed by antitrust violations, the Second Circuit
has noted: "Antitrust violations can affect hundreds of thousands-perhaps millions-of people
and inflict staggering economic damage." American Safety Equip. v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 391
F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968). Surely the costs of forbidding a beneficial activity must be as
comparably high as the costs of allowing violations.
152 If the condemned activity is actually efficient, then it will work to possibly reduce
costs, increase output, or perhaps create new product market. These effects work to create
wealth for the company.
153 See supra note 152.
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solutions.154 Typically these proposed solutions involve a simplification of the
rule of reason analysis-an "intermediate rule of reason."155
B. The Intermediate Rule ofReason
The underlying premise of the rule of reason-careful examination of the
economic impact of novel business practices-is admirable. Therefore,
commentators are eager to keep the rule of reason as a part of antitrust
jurisprudence, while suggesting minor modifications to make its application less
costly and more fair.156 However, no matter how the rule of reason is restructured
in order to reduce costs and simplify the analysis, problems still remain, for even
the most basic inquiries under the rule of reason are expensive and difficult to
accurately obtain.157
Perhaps the most well-known construction of an intermediate rule of reason
has been proposed by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook.1 58 Easterbrook begins his
analysis by observing the inability of judges and juries to adequately deal with
complex antitrust issues under the rule of reason.159 He goes on to note that this
inability imposes substantial costs--the possibility that an erroneous
154 See generally 56 ANTITRUST 193-234 (1987) (a collection of several commentators'
suggestions for making the rule of reason more manageable); M. Laurence Popofsky & David
B. Goodwin, The "Hard-Boiled" Rule of Reason Revisited, 56 ANTITRUST 195 (1987)
(suggesting that courts are using a series of presumptions and shortcuts to simplify rule of
reason analysis); F.M. Scherer, Malng the Rule of Reason Analysis More Manageable, 56
ANTIrRoST 229 (1987) (making a number of suggestions, such as economic training for judges
and employing economists as clerks); The Honorable William W. Schwarzer, Summary
Judgment and Case Management, 56 ANTITRUST 213 (1987) (suggesting the use of summary
judgment in order to make cases more manageable).
155 See Gladieux, supra note 1, at 489 (noting how various commentators have suggested
alternative approaches to the rule of reason involving the use of presumptions and key factors of
analysis. Gladieux suggests that these alternative approaches create an "intermediate rule of
reason" somewhere in the between the "sharply defined dichotomy of per se and rule of
reason").
156 See, e.g., 7 AREEDA, supra note 36, at 1500-11 (1986); Easterbrook, supra note 7;
Piraino, supra note 108 (proposing a "continuum" where the burden placed upon an antitrust
plaintiff shifts depending upon the type of agreement in question); Lawrence A. Sullivan, The
Viability of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints, 75 CAL. L. REV. 835 (1987). These four
approaches have been collected and summarized in Gladieux, supra note 1, at 489-93.
157 See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
158 See Easterbrook, supra note 7. Easterbrook's suggestions have stimulated numerous
criticisms and responses. See, e.g., Markovits, supra note 33 (concluding that simplifying the
rule of reason will lead to inaccuracies); Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEo.
L. 271 (1987-88) (concluding that Easterbrook's filters are not an accurate measure of a
particular agreement's economic impact).
159 See Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 4-6.
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condemnation will forbid the use of an efficient business activity for all time.160
As a solution, Easterbrook observes how economists deal with complex
theoretical issues-they use a series of presumptions and shortcuts in order to
simplify the analysis. 161 Easterbrook proposes that the courts should adopt a
similar approach under the rule of reason, where a series of presumptions could
be used to simplify and structure the rule of reason analysis.162 Easterbrook refers
to this use of presumptions as "[a] filter approach to antitrust scrutiny.' 163
Easterbrook proposes using a series of "filters" which will weed out from the
judicial system cases involving practices which are not likely to cause substantial
economic harm. If a case is unable to pass through a certain filter, then it is
dismissed.164 Some of Easterbrook's proposed filters include (1) market
power;' 65 (2) whether the defendant is enriching him or herself at the expense of
consumers;166 (3) the widespread adoption of the same business practices by
competitors; 167 (4) the effect of this business practice upon output and
survival; 168 and (5) the identity of the plaintiff.'69 Easterbrook argues that the
160 See id
161 See id at 11 (noting that economists resort to "clues and shortcuts" in order to solve
complicated economic issues).
162 See id at 14 ("Courts should use the economists' way out. They should adopt some
simple presumptions that structure antitrust inquiry. Strong presumptions would guide
businesses in planning their affairs by making it possible for counsel to state that some things do
not create risks of liability.').
163 rd.
164See id at 17 (describing the filter system as a method of weeding out of the legal
system those practices which are "probably-beneficial").
165 Market power is the power to control prices or exclude competition. See United States
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956). If an antitrust defendant has no
market power, then the likelihood that a defendants actions are causing economic harm is
minimal. If the defendant engages in some anticompetitive activity that harms consumers, then
competitors will be able sell at a lower price, thus causing substantial harm to the defendant. See
id. at 19.
166 See Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 24 ("Unless there is a link between the antitrust
injury and the defendant's profit, there is no need for judges to impose a sanction."). In other
words, if the defendant is not profiting by his or her business practices then the subsequent
business losses will force the defendant to quit the activity. Id
167 Easterbrook argues that unless nearly all the firms in a given industry are employing
the same business practice, then the antitrust action should be dismissed. See id at 30-33.
Easterbrook premises this assertion upon the idea that nearly all arrangements which get past
the first two filters will be vertical arrangements, where a firm that is higher in the chain of
production (e.g. a manufacturer) imposes a restraint upon a firm farther down the chain of
production (e.g. a retailer). See id at 29. Easterbrook argues that such a vertical restraint will not
work unless all other firms are practicing the same restraint If not, then another firm not
employing the restraint will be able to take business away from the defendant. See id.
168 Easterbrook asserts that if a firm's output and market share have not decreased since
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adoption of these filters will insure that only those cases likely to have an actual,
adverse economic effect will be adjudicated under the rule of reason.
Use of presumptions of the sort recommended by Easterbrook will certainly
reduce costs and improve certainty in antitrust adjudication-to an extent.170
However, the nature of Easterbrook's suggested rule of reason is such that
establishing even preliminary matters will be an extremely burdensome task. For
instance, consider Easterbrook's first filter, market power.171  Under
Easterbrook's system, if an antitrust plaintiff can not prove that the defendant had
market power, then the case will be dismissed. 172 In his discussion of the market
power filter, Easterbrook notes that in many cases, it will be fairly easy to
establish market power, suggesting that a court could establish market power
nearly instantaneously by establishing either (a) an ability to raise prices or (b) a
price difference between the defendant's goods and the products of rivals. 173
However, even these "simple" cases will likely require extensive evaluation of
economic data and a substantial possibility of an erroneous decision.174 Of more
concern are those cases where these economic effects are difficult or impossible
employing the business practice in question, then the practice is not anticompetitive and the
antitrust action should be dismissed. See id at 31. Easterbrook premises this filter upon the law
of demand-if a firm is raising the price of a product, and the product remains at the same
quality, then it will sell less of that product. Id
169 Easterbrook notes that bringing an antitrust claim against a rival might be an effective
way to impose substantial costs upon that rival. See id. at 33-34 ("Antitrust is attractive as a
method of raising rivals' costs because of the asymmetrical structure of incentives."). Therefore
he asserts that antitrust suits should continue to be dismissed depending upon the identity of the
antitrust plaintiff (consumer or rival) and the nature of the antitrust claim. See id. at 36. For
instance, a suit brought against a firm by a competitor alleging predatory pricing can be
dismissed without too much threat of competitive harm, because it is more likely that the
defendant is employing efficient business practices than that the plaintiff is unwilling or unable
to duplicate. See id at 36-37.
170 It is worth noting that Easterbrook's proposed filter system will not work to reverse the
fact that a rule of reason case will nearly always result in a victory for the defendant. As
Easterbrook himself concedes, "[i]t is hard to compile a list of ten cases in the history of
antitrust that would proceed past [the third] filter [without getting dismissed]." Id at 31.
171 An examination of market power has been deemed an important element of the
intermediate rule of reason by other commentators. See, e.g., Piraino, supra note 108
(encouraging courts to employ market power analysis to decide cases under his "continuum
approach").
172 See supra note 165.
173 See Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 22-23.
174 As noted above, lag effects may result in an economic effect, which might not become
apparent until a substantial time period after the firm obtains market power. See supra notes 75-
77 and accompanying text. In addition, it is dangerous to attribute a rise in prices to market
power, because a firm may be able to raise prices above its rivals for completely legitimate
reasons. See, e.g., George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRuST 807, 814-15
(1991-92).
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to establish. In that case, most commentators agree that a court would have to first
define the relevant product market and then establish the defendant's share of that
market.' 75 Defining the relevant market is rarely easy, for one must consider not
only the product being sold by the defendant but also any possible substitutes for
that product.' 76 Defining a relevant product market is a difficult task, often
representing the sole issue in lengthy and protracted litigation.177 Defining the
175 See, e.g., McFalls, supra note 75, at 661 ("Foremost among these measures [of market
power] is market share, the percentage of sales or capacity that a firm controls in a relevant
market").
However, there are other suggested methods of determining market power, each of which
are as difficult to administer as the market share analysis. One method is the Lemer Index,
which tries to measure market power by how much a firm's price differs from its marginal cost.
The Lemer Index is calculated by subtracting a firm's marginal cost from its price, and then
dividing that figure by the firm's price. The closer this figure is to approaching one, the higher a
firm's market power. See id. at 659. However, the Lemer Index is difficult o administer because
it is very difficult to calculate a firm's marginal cost at any given time. The Lemer Index also
fails to take into account external factors which might cause a shift in price, such as a change in
consumer demand or a change in the price of materials. See id Additionally, a firm may be able
to price above marginal cost in certain situations, not because it has market power, but because
it is able to produce a superior product. See Hay, supra note 174, at 814-15.
Another suggested method is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HI) which determines
market power by measuring a firm's market share in relation to the shares. The Hill squares the
market shares held by each firm in order to establish an indication of how concentrated the
market is. See McFalls, supra note 75, at 663. The HHI is used largely to reflect how
concentrated the market is in order to reflect the possibility of oligopolistic pricing coordination.
See id The problem with the HI is that in order to calculate the Hi, you must first calculate
market share, something that is often very difficult to do. See infra notes 177-78 and
accompanying text
Some commentators suggest that market power should be determined by first, evaluating
how inelastic a particular firm's demand curve is, and then evaluating whether this demand
curve is just a transitory result or something more permanent. See Warren S. Grimes, Wen Do
Franchisors Have Market Power? Antitrust Remedies for Franchisor Opportunism, 65
ANrraUST 105,113 (1996).
176 See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,395 (1956).
177 See generally E.. du Pont de Nemows & Co., 351 U.S. at 377. The basis of the
controversy in du Pont was whether the relevant market should be expanded to include
products that would make a substitute for du Pont's cellophane packaging. It is worth noting
that many commentators feel that the du Pont court used erroneous economic reasoning in
reaching its decision. The du Pont court reasoned that du Pont could not raise its prices without
losing business to other types of flexible packaging. However, the Court failed to consider that
perhaps du Pont was already pricing at monopoly levels, and was only prevented from raising
prices even further. This error in reasoning is referred to as The Cellophane Fallacy. See Donald
F. Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REv. 281, 308-10 (1956);
Gene C. Schaerr, Note, The Cellophane Fallacy and the Justice Department's Guidelines for
Horizontal Mergers, 94 YALE L. 670,676-77 (1985).
The difficulty in defining the relevant market is indicated by the complexity of the 1992
federal Merger Guidelines. See Grimes, supra note 175, at 114 & n.34 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF
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relevant market has become increasingly more difficult, with the globalization of
the economy, making it more difficult to ascertain when reasonable substitutes
exist and when they do not.178 Once the market is defined, collecting and
interpreting a firm's data in order to establish the firm's share of that market is an
equally difficult process.179 Additional factors make the process even more
demanding. In a market that is particularly volatile or dynamic, market share
might not be an accurate representation of a firm's market power.180 If a firm has
a high market share, it still must be determined whether or not the firm is capable
of maintaining that market share-an additional complication which must be
dealt with.181 Additionally, there is considerable debate as to how much of a
market share is actually required to constitute market power.182 Easterbrook tries
to use filters in order to eliminate costs and improve certainty in rule of reason
adjudication. However, even his most basic initial filter, market power, is very
difficult and expensive to apply.
The problems with Easterbrook's market power filter are illustrative of a
broader problem that is inherent to the rule of reason analysis. In order to be truly
a rule of reason, a method of analysis must make some determinations on a case-
by-case basis.183 As the above discussion of the market power filter suggests,
even the most basic, initial factual inquiries will be enormously expensive and
will produce uncertain results. An intermediate rule of reason may be useful in
reducing litigation costs and simplifying the process. However, no matter how
JUsTiCE & FED. TRADE COMWN, HORrZONTAL MERGER GUmELNEs (1992), reprinted in
Merger Guidelines-1992, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104, at 20,569 (May 5, 1992)).
178 See, e.g., Andrew L. Shapiro, Doer Microsoft Play by the Rules?, WEB MAGAZINE,
Feb. 1998, at 29 (noting how the global nature of the technology market makes markets
difficult to define).
179 See McFalls, supra note 75, at 662 (noting that market share calculations can be
"complex and expensive undertakings').
180 See Hay, supra note 174, at 821 (noting that market shares are based upon historical
data, which may not provide an accurate representation of volatile markets).
181 See, e.g., United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding no
market power where there was ease of entry into the movie theatre market).
182 Judge Learned Hand's discussion of market share: "The percentage we have already
mentioned-over ninety ... is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or
sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three percent is not" United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945). Courts have had a difficult time
determining exactly what share of the market is necessary to constitute market power. See, e.g.,
Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990) (commenting on how
different courts have reached different results as to what minimum share of the market
constitutes market power).
183 If the test does not involve some sort of case-by-case determination, then it would
cease to become a rule of reason, and would look more like a per se determination.
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abbreviated and simplified the process is, some factual determinations must still
be made, and these determinations will always be difficult and expensive.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS-ABOLITION OF THE RULE OF REASON
A. The Proposal
In tracing the development and application of the rule of reason, it becomes
apparent that the rule of reason has become an expensive process where the
agreement will almost always be found legal.' 8 4 This result has disturbed many
commentators, resulting in many suggestions as to how application of the rule of
reason might be altered in order to reduce costs and produce a more just result.185
However, perhaps mere alteration of the rule of reason is not enough. 86 Perhaps
the rule of reason is inherently flawed and should be eliminated.
This Note suggests that the full-blown rule of reason should no longer be
applied in Section 1 antitrust cases. In its place should be a new standard of per se
legality. Under this new method of adjudication, Section 1 antitrust cases would
still be divided into two categories. In one category would still contain the cases
so blatantly anticompetitive as to be per se illegal. The second category would
include all cases that did not qualify as per se illegal. Ordinarily these cases would
then be adjudicated under the rule of reason. Under the new standard, these
agreements would be declared per se legal and dismissed.
As noted above, there are often extensive investigations made before a
particular activity is found to fall under the rule of reason or the per se rule.187
Some categories of behavior, such as group boycotts and tying arrangements,
require extensive investigation before categorizing the activity as per se illegal. 188
Other cases warrant a "quick look" before it is determined whether or not the full-
blown rule of reason is necessary.189 It must be noted that the per se legality
standard suggested by this Note does not work to eliminate these initial inquiries,
but only the full-blown rule of reason analysis that follows.
This proposed change seems to represent a radical departure from traditional
antitrust adjudication, of which the rule of reason has been a major part since
184 See supra Part ll.C.5.
185 See supra note 154 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.B.
186 This is because no matter how simplified the rule of reason becomes, at least some
factual inquiries must still be made, and these inquiries will be inherently expensive. See supra
text accompanying notes 164-83.
18 7 See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text; see also Gladieux, supra note 1, at
480 (asserting that the Supreme Court has "eroded the traditional, sharp distinction between per
se and rule of reason cases in favor of factual inquiries").
18 8 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
18 9 See supra note 99-100 and accompanying text
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1911.190 However, for all practical purposes, the change is minimal. As noted
above, a plaintiff will, almost without exception, avoid liability under the rule of
reason. 191 Applying a per se legality standard, will directly do what had been
done before indirectly.
While for all practical purposes, imposition of a per se legality standard will
result in minimal change, this new rule will eliminate the substantial litigation and
information costs which are part of the rule of reason. The new rule will not
merely transfer these costs over to the preliminary stage of the litigation, where a
case is initially classified as per se illegal or falling under the rule of reason. As
noted above, given the extreme difficulty associated with winning a rule of reason
case, the litigation at the initial stages of a Section 1 case will be fierce. 192 Both
sides will be expending tremendous resources trying to show that a particular case
is either per se illegal or not.193 In most cases, it seems fair to say that, at the
initial level of a trial, both sides are expending the maximum level of available
resources because this initial determination effectively determines the outcome of
the trial.194 Because both sides are likely to be already expending the maximum
level of resources at the initial stage of a Section 1 trial, imposition of a per se
legality standard will do little to increase costs at this stage.195
190 See supra Part IL.C2 and accompanying text.
191 See supra Part II.C.5 and accompanying text. Where certain types of cases result in a
large percentage of verdicts favoring one side or the other, there are two explanations. First,
perhaps the merits of a particular type of case are such that one side should always win. Second,
perhaps there are certain flaws in the adjudication process which give one side a particular
advantage that is completely independent of the merits of the case. See id. In a rule of reason
case, either explanation supports the per se legality standard. If antitrust defendants are
rightfully winning on the merits, then nothing is lost by immediately dismissing the case at the
outset. If antitrust defendants are winning for reasons unrelated to the merits, then in all
likelihood, it is a problem that cannot be avoided. As noted above, the advantages that an
antitrust defendant enjoys are the result of problems that are inherent to the rule of reason. See
supra notes 170-83.
192 See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
193 See id
194 The present antitrust suit brought by the government might represent the best
indication of the time and expense that is involved in the initial classification of the agreement
The justice department's principle Section 1 claim against Microsoft is that it has engaged in
illegal tying arrangements. See infra notes 235-41. As a result, both sides have expended
tremendous resources characterizing the tying arrangement as falling under either the per se rule
or the rule of reason. For a more detailed discussion of these expenditures, see infra note 246
and accompanying text
195 Remember also that the examination made at the initial stages of a Section 1 trial
requires an examination of differentfactors than the examination made at the rule of reason
stage. At the initial stage of a trial, the primary controversy will likely center around classifying
the agreement-does it fall into a category which has typically been found to be per se illegal?
See, e.g., Discon, Inc. v. Nynex Corp., 93 F.3d 1055 (2d Cir. 1996) decision vacated, 119 S. Ct
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This proposed per se legality rule seems absurdly unfair. Some economic
arrangements may not qualify as per se illegal, but may still be anticompetitive.
Under the proposed change, these anticompetitive activities would be allowed to
continue unchecked by the American justice system. However, while these
activities might avoid scrutiny in the courtroom, they will not be able to avoid
scrutiny in the marketplace. The marketplace may very well provide a superior
means of evaluating these activities.
B. The Comparative Advantage ofMarkets over Courts
In many instances, where a firm is abusing monopoly power, the free market
will be able to step in and cure the defect. Any firm with monopoly power will
likely be charging higher prices than what will be charged in a perfectly
competitive market.196 Other individuals will see what high prices might be had
in this market, and therefore enter the market, undersell the market, and take away
business. 197 Judge Easterbrook has taken note of the free market's ability to
correct situations where a firm is utilizing market power, often suggesting that the
free market actually might be superior to the courts in adjudicating antitrust
disputes.' 98 Easterbrook has often based his argument upon the economic theory
of comparative advantage.199
Comparative advantage means that one option has a relative advantage over
493, 497 (1998). Or, in the case of tying arrangements or group boycotts, the controversy will
center around whether certain requirements, such as market power, have been satisfied. See
supra note 98 and accompanying text. At the rule of reason stage of a trial, the controversy will
likely center around factors such as adverse economic effect. While these factual examinations
might overlap to an extent, e.g., both might require a determination of market power, they
remain different controversies at different stages of the trial. By implementing a per se legality
standard, the costs associated with the full-blown rule of reason analysis could be eliminated.
196 In a perfectly competitive market, the price that one finn will be able to charge will
always be equal to marginal costs. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBwNFELD,
MICROECONOMICS 240 (3d ed. 1995). Where a firm is exerting monopoly power, it will be able
to charge a higher price. See id at 322-24.
197 See id at 259. Where there is a high rate of return, other investors will divert finds
from other sources and enter into the more profitable market. The increased number of
suppliers will cause the supply curve for the market to shift out, reducing price until it returns to
a competitive level. This competitive level is referred to as the long-run competitive
equilibrium. Id
198 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 108, at 307 ("If there are profits to be made, rivals
enter (or expand their production) and undercut the monopolists.); Easterbrook, supra note 147
(same); see also, 7 AREEDA, supra note 36, at 112 (CIf the facts do not support a fairly
unambiguous judgment that intervention will make things better, then the best course of action
for the antitrust tribunal is not to intervene at all.").
199 The theory of comparative advantage was first developed by David Ricardo, a major
nineteenth-century British economist. See CASE & FAIR, supra note 75, at 30, 547.
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the next best option, despite the fact that the first option might have an absolute
advantage over the second.200 For instance, consider a lawyer and an automobile
mechanic. The lawyer might be better at both practicing law and fixing cars than
the mechanic. However, if the lawyer was to fix her own car, she would have to
forego time spent practicing law. Therefore her time is spent most productively if
she practices law full time and delegates fixing the car to the mechanic.20 1 The
economic theory of comparative advantage "argues for specialization." 202
The law might have an absolute advantage over markets in adjudicating
antitrust disputes. It might be able to speed up the market forces that work to
restore a competitive equilibrium.2 03 However, it is unclear whether or not the
law does work faster and more efficiently than the free market If it does not, then
perhaps antitrust law might be best delegated to the free market while the courts
work out other disputes.2 04 Easterbrook suggests three factors to consider in
determining whether or not the market has a comparative advantage over courts
in adjudicating a particular type of antitrust dispute.
First, Easterbrook asserts that in order to have a comparative advantage over
the courts, the free market must be able to adjudicate a case faster than the market
will be able to do so. If the free market can step in and undo an antitrust violation
before the courts can, then it does not make sense to incur the litigation costs of a
trial that does not need to take place.205
Second, Easterbrook looks at the costs of courts taking action under the
antitrust laws. Easterbrook notes that one substantial cost of antitrust law might be
condemnation of behavior which might actually be economically beneficial.20 6
As noted above, the costs of these false positives might be substantia 207-an
200 See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 196, at 582 (discussing comparative
advantage in the context of international trade).
201 For similar examples, see id (using two countries, each one has, a comparative
advantage over the other in producing a certain product); Easterbrook, supra note 147, at 984-
85 (comparing a computer repair person and a law professor).202 CooTER & ULEN, supra note 122, at 28.
203 See, e.g., 7 AREEDA, supra note 36, at 112 (concluding that the free market may need
occasional legal intervention).
204 See Easterbrook, supra note 147, at 985 ("Perhaps antitrust law speeds up the arrival
of the long run. Perhaps it does not. Unless we know it does, judges ought to apply their talents
in other fields, where they have a comparative advantage over other institutions.").
205 Id ("If rivals will undo a monopoly or evade a questionable practice before judges can
decide the case, there is little point in incurring the costs of litigation and suffering the inevitable
mistaken judgments.").
206 Id ('If ajudge wrongly condemns as monopolistic a business practice that is efficient
and beneficial to consumers, that is a false positive. Consumers would be better off if the judge
had decided the case the other way.').
207 See supra notes 150-53.
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efficient business activity might be gone for good.208 Easterbrook asserts that if
the business practice is new or novel, courts are more likely to make mistakes,
declaring business practices to be illegal before their true economic impact is ever
developed, thus increasing the costs of using the law to decide antitrust cases.2 09
Third, Easterbrook evaluates the costs of judicial inaction-even where an
inefficient business practice is allowed to continue. Easterbrook suggests that the
market may have a competitive advantage over the law where an erroneous
dismissal can be quickly rectified by the market. In that case, the problem is
quickly solved and the costs of judicial inaction are minimie If the market is
slow about fixing situations where an inefficient practice is allowed to continue,
then it is best for the courts to step in and speed up the process 210 Thus
Easterbrook asserts that markets may have a comparative advantage over judges
in adjudicating antitrust disputes when (a) legal processes are slow;, (b) the judges
and jury are unfamiliar with the economic practices so that there is a high risk of
false positives; and (c) the market is quickly able to correct any false negatives. 211
Describing the theory of comparative advantage, Easterbrook notes that there
208 See Easterbrook, supra note 147, at 986:
It may be prudent for a court to act on limited knowledge if a mistaken condemnation can
be washed away as easily as the contrary error would be. Yet there is a bias in the error-
correcting devices of the law. Mistakes of law are not subject to competitive pressures. If a
judge errs in saying that the NCAA's contract with the TV networks for college football is
a violation, there is no competitive way to undermine the contract Once the court speaks,
the contract is gone. If the prohibition was mistaken, we shall suffer the consequences
indefinitely.
Easterbrook's statement is a slight exaggeration. When an efficient business activity is
mistakenly condemned by the court, there is always the chance that the court will reverse itselt
once it realizes its error. For example, consider vertical nonprice restraints. At one time these
types of agreements were held to be per se illegal. See generally United States v. Arnold
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). However, the Schwinn decision was widely criticized on
historical, logical, and economic grounds. See, e.g., Milton Handler, Changing Trends in
Antitrust Doctrine: An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term-1977, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 979,
980 (1977). After 10 years, the Schwinn decision was overruled by a Supreme Court decision
holding nonprice vertical restraints to be adjudicated under the rule of reason. See generally
Continental v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). However, even in the case of Schwinn, firms
were denied the opportunity to employ a potentially efficient business practice for a full 10
years-at a substantial economic cost.
209 See Easterbrook, supra note 108, at 308 ('The conditions for useful legal intervention
may be met when we know a lot about the practice-for when we know but little, the cost of
error goes up, and the risks of false positives may be substantial.").
2 10 See Easterbrook, supra note 147, at 985 ("Unless there is a strong reason to suspect
that a monopoly or monopolistic practice can survive the attempts of other firms to undermine
it, then the costs of inaction (excusing harmful conduct) are low.').
211 See id at 986.
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are certain types of antitrust cases where the law might have a comparative
advantage over markets-specifically naked price-fixing cartels and large
mergers in markets with high barriers to entry can be quickly and accurately
condemned by the courts. 212 Easterbrook also suggests that courts rarely have a
comparative advantage over markets where the business activity is new or
novel. 213 However, Easterbrook leaves the issue of comparative advantage and its
application to antitrust law largely unresolved, noting that: "having raised the
issue [of comparative advantage], I shall leave the implications unexplored for
now."214 In particular, Easterbrook does not theorize as to how the theory of
comparative advantage might be applied to rule of reason cases. As noted above,
in regards to the rule of reason, Easterbrook has written in support of an
intermediate rule of reason2 15 However, when Easterbrook's comparative
advantage theory is applied to rule of reason cases, the market might have a
comparative advantage to the courts in adjudicating antitrust cases-indicating
that these cases should simply be dismissed and left to the market to resolve.
Easterbrook asserts that markets have a comparative advantage to judges
when legal processes are slow.2 16 There are not many trials which last as long or
proceed as slowly as a rule of reason antitrust suit. The average antitrust trial lasts
for two years. 217 Given its complexity and need for extensive data gathering and
interpretation, a rule of reason case may take much longer to resolve.
Additionally, while the actual trial time for an antitrust case may be substantial,
one must also consider any time lapse between when the anticompetitve practice
is begun, and when suit is actually brought.2 18 While a court case may take
months or even years to reach the courtroom, market forces will begin almost
immediately after competing firms recognize an opportunity to enter into the
market This gives the free market ample time to remedy the problem before
courts do. For example, a federal district court in Utah has begun to make
headway in an antitrust case brought by a software developer called Caldera
2 12 See Easterbrook, supra note 108, at 309-10.
213 Id.
2 14 Easterbrook, supra note 147 at 989.
215 See supra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
2 16 See Easterbrook, supra note 147 at 986.
2 17 See Salop & White, supra note 117, at 1009.
218 For example, after Microsoft's tremendous success in the software industry started to
attract attention, the FTC began to conduct an investigation of Microsoft's activities. The initial
investigation began in 1990. See Kenny & Jordan, supra note 24, at 1374. After three years of
investigation, the FTC decided it did not have sufficient evidence to bring a significant suit
against Microsoft. Id The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department decided to take up the
investigation of Microsoft; and in 1993, filed both a complaint and a proposed consent decree in
federal district court. Id Thus it took over three years from the time the alleged anticompetitive
conduct was noticed until the time that an actual suit was filed-a significant time lag.
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against Microsoft for anticompetitive practices dating back six years, involving its
DOS operating system. 219 In that six year period, the DOS operating system has
become severely outdated-replaced by the Windows operating system.
Easterbrook next notes that markets have a comparative advantage where it is
a novel business practice being evaluated which has never come before the
courts.220 Any rule-of-reason case will invariably present a novel or unusual
business practice. More traditional categories of economic behavior will be
dispensed with by the per se rule.221 Of the types of behavior categorized under
the rule of reason, any economic behavior that the courts are familiar with and
have already ruled upon will not likely result in litigation. 222 This leaves only
those novel and unusual business practices unfamiliar to the courts to be actually
adjudicated under the rule of reason 223-thus increasing the risk of mistakes and
increasing the possibility that markets have a comparative advantage over courts.
Even where the courts are making erroneous dismissals, Easterbrook argues
that the law will have a comparative advantage over markets where the market is
2 19 See Shapiro, supra note 178, at 27 (discussing Caldera v. Microsoft Corp., No. 96-CV-
645 B (D. Utah 1998)).
220 See Easterbrook, supra note 147, at 985-86 (discussing how hasty decisions regarding
novel business practices may be costly).
221 The per se cases are the cases where judges will place the greatest emphasis on past
antitrust precedent. See generally United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). In
Topco, the Supreme Court invoked the per se rule against naked cartels to condemn exclusive
marketing territories used by ajoint venture of small grocers, in the face of trial court findings
that the exclusivity was necessary to the joint venture's success. See id at 608 & n.8 (citing
United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1042 (N.D. Ill. 1970)). The Court did
not disagree with these findings. Rather, the Court held that the case was controlled by
precedent which could not be altered by economic findings. See id at 608, 610-11. The Court
explicitly advocated adhering to hard and fast legal rules rather than "rambl[ing] through the
wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach." See idt at 609-10 n.10; see
also Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman
Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263, 309 (1986) (stating that, when using the per se rule, "the Supreme
Court purports to follow precedent, acting as if antitrust law were a coherent body of
congressionally-set legal principles"); Ralph Eiseg Bienstock, Municipal Antitrust Liability:
Beyond Immunity, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1829, 1838 (1985) ('The purpose of any per se rule is to
simplify litigation in cases which present familiar fact patterns."); Ricks, supra note 106, at 175
('The per se rule should only be applied when the court is familiar enough with the
arrangement at issue to say with certainty that the arrangement is almost always
anticompetitive.').
222 Where there is a case directly on point, business people will be less likely to perform
the activity in the first place. See Crane, supra note 118, at 16 (noting that it will be easier to
convince a client not to perform a certain business activity if there is a case directly on point).
223 See, e.g., Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast System, 441 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1979) (noting that "it is only after considerable experience with certain relationships that the
courts classify them as per se violations") (citing United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S.
596,607-08 (1972)).
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"sluggish" in responding where a procompetitive activity is mistakenly declared
to be illegal.2 24 In today's economy, however, competitive processes move faster
than ever to correct market flaws. With today's globalized economy, more and
more potential competitors are poised to step in and undersell firms selling at
monopoly prices. 225 Today's markets have proven to be highly competitive,
where one firm is rarely dominant for long.226 This is particularly true in today's
growing high-tech industry 2 27 For instance, in 1974, IBM was perceived as the
"monolithic, irrepressible force in the computer industry,"228 yet by 1982 it had
become clear that BM was no longer a power in the computer market 229 These
are strong indications that the market is able to move quickly to remedy
anticompetitive conduct which is allowed to continue by the courts.
Using Easterbrook's theory of comparative advantage, there is a strong
argument that it is the market and not the court system, which might be the best
means of evaluating business activities under the rule of reason. With this
conclusion, it becomes far less disturbing to allow certain business practices
evaluated under the rule of reason to be declared per se legal and dismissed.
Although this new construction of Section 1 would insulate certain business
practices from judicial scrutiny, these practices would still be scrutinized by a free
market that would be more capable of evaluating the economic activity.
224 See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
225 See Crane, supra note 118, at 6. (noting that the "internationalization" of the American
economy has "limited the ability of domestic companies, even those that were considered near-
monopolies a generation ago, to raise price."). Crane cites the steel and automobile industries as
two specific examples where domestic firms are unable to abuse domestic monopoly power
because of competitive pressures from foreign firms. Id
2 26 See Kenny & Jordan, supra note 24, at 1365 (noting that "today's winners can very
easily be tomorrow's losers.").
2 27 See Charles T.C. Compton, Cooperation, Collaboration, and Coalition: A Perspective
on the Types and Purposes of Technology Joint Ventures, 61 ANTrxUST 861, 868-69 (1993)
(' High technology companies are typically locked in a vicious circle of global competition:
Innovation creates demand; demand creates more competition; competition leads to lower
prices and more innovation, at ever-increasing fixed costs; price erosion and performance
improvements accelerate demand further."); see also PErER HuBER, THE LAw AND DIsoRDER
IN CYBERSPACE 9 (1997) (noting that the computer industry has "set reasonable prices, and
delivered more hardware and more services to more people faster than any other industry in
history').
22 8 Kerny & Jordan, supra note 24, at 1365-66.
22 9 See id at 1366 (citing HuBER, supra note 227, at 92) ("By 1982 the competitive
outlook was clear... Between 1985 and 1992 IBM shed a hundred thousand employees.
IBM's stock, worth $176 a share in 1987, collapsed to $52 by year's end 1992 .... In a
desperate scramble for survival, BM began breaking itself up into autonomous units and
spinning off some of its more successful divisions.!).
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C. Application of the Per Se Legality Standard to the Justice Department's
Suit Against Microsoft
If a per se legality standard is going to be used to resolve Section 1 rule of
reason cases, then it is imperative that some devices still remain that will be able
to cure abuses of market power. Otherwise, there would be no check on a firm's
ability to enter into inefficient business agreements. An application of
Easterbrook's comparative advantage theory suggests that the market might be
comparatively superior to courts in resolving antitrust issues. However, it remains
to be seen how this theory might work in an actual case. A useful case to examine
is the current antitrust suit by United States Justice Department against
Microsoft.2 30
Currently, Microsoft owns a commanding share of the market for operating
systems 231 Microsoft has achieved this high market share through a variety of
aggressive business tactics-many of which have been declared by others to be
morally and legally questionable.232 As a result, Microsoft has often come under
the scrutiny of the antitrust laws.2 33 Most recently, the United States Justice
230 See Plaintiffs Complaint, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (No. 98-1232), available
at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/fl700/1763.htm> (visited Apr. 20,2000).231 The Justice Department contends that Microsoft owns 90% of the market for operating
systems for new Intel-compatible computers. See Plaintiffs Complaint at 1. Even if the
relevant market was expanded to include non-Intel compatible computers, such as computers
using the Motorolla microprocessor, Microsoft's market share remains at 80%. See Bryce J.
Jones, II & James R. Turner, Can an Operating System Vendor Have a Duty to Aid Its
Competitors? 37 JURMETRICS J. 355, 370 (1997). Such a high market share does create a
presumption of market power. Not only does Microsoft have a high market share, but, the
government contends, that it is very capable of maintaining that share through a series of
"network effects." See infra note 264.
232 The story of Microsoft's rise to power is well-known. In 1980, IBM, then a giant in the
field of personal computers, needed an operating system for its new computer. See Kenny &
Jordan, supra note 24, at 1374. Originally, it went to a firm called Digital Research
Incorporated (DRI), which had developed the dominant operating system of the day, called
CP/M. See id. DRI, however, refused IBM's bid to license CP/M. See id. IBM next solicited the
fledgling Microsoft corporation. Microsoft bought the rights to a CP/M clone called QDOS,
made a few modifications, and licensed the program as MS-DOS. See idt Microsoft, however,
also retained the rights to license MS-DOS to other computer manufacturers besides IBM. See
id. Due to the success of the IBM personal computer, there became a tremendous demand for
computer software, developed largely by Microsoft, which would be compatible with MS-
DOS. See id. at 1375. Other computer manufacturers also used the MS-DOS operating system,
increasing the demand for Microsoft products. Later on, consumer demand remained high for
other Microsoft products, most notably its Windows 95 operating system. See id By 1998,
Microsoft's market capitalization passed $200 billion. See iad (citing Robert O'Brien, Stocks
Race to Further Records; Microsoft Shares Attain Milestone, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1998, at
C4).
233 For an overview of the government's antitrust investigations and legal actions taken
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Department has brought suit against Microsofi, alleging violations of both Section
1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act.2 34
The government has suggested two agreements which Microsoft has made
which might qualify as Section 1 violations. First that Microsoft has violated the
of Section 1 through its use of illegal tying agreements with personal computer
manufacturers, also known as Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). 35
The government alleges that Microsoft is forcing the OEMs to sell Microsoft
Windows (the tying product) along with Microsoft's web browser-Internet
Explorer (the tied product).2 36 As noted above, an illegal tying arrangement may
be found to be either per se illegal, or to fall under the rule of reason.2 37 A tying
arrangement is per se illegal only where certain conditions, such as market power
in the tying product are satisfied.238 Otherwise, the agreement is adjudicated
under the rule of reason. 39 In the present Microsoft case, it is questionable
whether Microsoft's tying arrangements satisfy the necessary per se conditions of
separate products240 and coercion. 241 For the sake of argument assume that
against Microsoft, see Kenny & Jordan, supra note 24, at 1374-82 (discussing the initial
investigation and the government's use of the consent decree to regulate Microsoft). For an
example of where private competitors have brought suit against Microsoft, see, e.g., Caldera v.
Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp.2d 1295 (D. Utah 1998).
2 34 See Plaintiff's Complaint, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (No. 98-1232), available
at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/caseslf1700/1763.htm> (visited Apr. 20,2000).
235 See Plaintiff's Complaint at 48.
2 36 See id The govemrnment alleges that this tying arrangement "prevents customers from
choosing among Internet browsers on their merits." Id
2 37 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
238 See id
239 See id
240 In order to be an illegal tying arrangement, there must be the linking of "two separate
product markets" See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 2, 21 (1983). In
Jefferson Parish, the majority of the Supreme Court held that whether or not products were
separate products depended upon whether or not there was separate demand for the products.
See id at 19 ("mhe answer to whether one or two products are involved turns not on the
functional relationship between them, but rather on the character of demand for the two
items:"). The government alleges that Windows and Internet Explorer are two separate and
distinct products. See Plaintiffs Complaint at 48. The government's position is bolstered by
the majority opinion in Jefferson Parish, because there appears to be separate demands for
Windows and Intemet Explorer. Microsoft contends that the two computer applications are so
integrated as to be one product. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, An Economic Analysis ofMicrosoft's
Conduct, ANTrmusT, Fall 1999, at 38, 40. In support of its position, Microsoft might cite to a
strong Jefferson Parish concurrence, which argued that one should look at whether or not the
products are functionally interrelated, rather than upon the character of demand. See Jefferson
Parish, 466 U.S. at 39-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Microsoft's case is bolstered by the D.C.
Circuit's conclusion that Windows and Internet Explorer are in fact one product. See United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 952 (1996) ("If the products have no separate
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neither of these two requirements have been satisfied, meaning that the
agreements will be adjudicated under the rule of reason.
The Justice Department's second alleged Section 1 violation is that Microsoft
has engaged in a series of agreements which unreasonably restrain trade in
violation of Section 1 242 Specifically, the justice department cites to agreements
between Microsoft and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Internet Content
Providers (ICPs), where Microsoft exchanges a favorable position on its
Windows desktop in exchange for the agreement not to "license, distribute or
promote non-Microsoft products."2 43 The government also cites to agreements
between Microsoft and the OEMs, where Microsoft exchanges permission to
license Windows in exchange for the OEMs' promise not to modify the boot-up
sequence and desktop screen which come with Windows.244 All of these
agreements are adjudicated under the rule of reason.245
Therefore, it is at least arguable that all of the Justice Department's Section 1
existence, it is incorrect to speak of the purchaser combining them.). But see, Case Note,
Revisiting the Separate Products Issue, 108 YALE Li. 1441, 1441 (1999) (criticizing the D.C.
Circuit's decision as inconsistent with existing tying law).
241 In order to constitute an illegal tying arrangement, consumers must actually be forced
into buying a product that they do not want to buy. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26-
29 (holding that consumers were not coerced into using anesthesiology services bundled
together with medical care, because consumers lacked price consciousness when they chose
their source of medical care). The government alleges that Microsoft's arrangements with the
OEMs are coercive in that many consumers who want the Windows operating system do not
want the accompanying web browser. See Plaintiffs Complaint at 36 (discussing how
corporate customers do not want their employees having intemet access). Microsoft contends
that while Interet Explorer is packaged along with Windows, no one is forcing consumers to
use Intemet Explorer. Consumers are free to choose whichever browser they want, using
minimal time and effort. See Kenneth N. Gilpin, In Microsoft Case, A Lot of Not Very Much,
N.Y. TIMWEs, Nov. 1, 1998, at 3-7.
242 See Plaintiff's Complaint at 47.
243 See id.
244 See id
245 The agreements with the ISPs and ICPs are best characterized as exclusive dealings
contracts, where two parties agree to do business with each other at the exclusion of
competitors. Such agreements are adjudicated under the rule of reason and are typically not
found to be anticompetitive. See, e.g., Pachard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243
F.2d 418, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("When an exclusive dealership 'is not part and parcel of a
scheme to monopolize and effective competition exists at both the seller and buyer levels, the
arrangement has invariably been upheld as a reasonable restraint of trade ..... "). The
agreements with the OEMs are also exclusionary contracts adjudicated under the rule of reason.
See Plaintiff's Complaint at 47.
One thing to consider is that Microsoft has yet to come up with a legitimate economic
justification for these exclusionary contracts. It has been suggested that Section 1 agreements,
even where usually brought under the rule of reason, might be found per se illegal in the
complete absence of an economic justification. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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claims would be adjudicated under the rule of reason. Under antitrust law in its
present state, this means a lengthy and costly trial 2 46 The government faces an
uphill battle on the rule of reason issues. With the government as the plaintiff in
this case, the financial burden placed on a plaintiff in a rule of reason case might
not be as large a concem2 47 However, in a rule of reason case, the burden still
remains upon the govenment to prove competitive harm. This will be difficult to
do. In regards to the tying claim, Microsoft is packaging Intemet Explorer along
with Windows at no extra cost to the consumer.248 It is difficult to see how
consumers are harmed when they are getting something for free.249 Even if
competitive harm might be established, Microsoft could argue that it has a
legitimate business justification in bundling the products together. Microsoft
246 In the present case brought by the Justice Department against Microsoft, the trial,
begun on October 19, 1998, while once expected to last two months, has dragged on for much
longer than expected. See Jube Shiver Jr., Change in Industry Dims Relevance of Microsoft
Trial Technology: Allegation of Unfair Use of Dominance Is Undermined by AOL-Netscape
Merger, LA. TIMEs, Dec. 14,1998 at Al, available in 1998 WL 18903649. There will almost
certainly be an appeal-the case will likely go all the way to the Supreme Court, adding several
years to the process. See Michael M. Weinstein, Previous Antitrust Cases Leave Room for Both
Sides to Cite Them Now, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 19, 1998, at C-10; Dori Jones Yang, The Empire
Strikes Out: The Legal Prognosis Isn't Real Pretty. And the Marketplace is Even Scarier, U.S.
NEvS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 15, 1999, at 48 (noting that if there is an appeal, then the trial
will continue for at least another year).
As an indication of the litigation costs involved in the Microsoft trial, it is estimated that in
the most recent suit against Microsoft, the Justice Department has spent an estimated $133
million. See Justice Department, supra note 117.
247 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
248 See Heather Green, Has Netscape Hit the "Innovation Ceiling? ", Bus. WK., Jan. 19,
1998, at 69 (noting that both Netscape and Microsoft have offered their browsers free of
charge).
249 It is hard to see how consumers are harmed by lower prices. One notable exception is
predatory pricing, where one competitor sells a product at below cost in order to drive
competitors out of the business. Once competitors are eliminated, the survivor can sell at
monopoly prices See generally GIFFORD & RASKIND, supra note 17, at 429-60. Typically,
predatory pricing schemes are self-deterring, because, while a firm is selling at below-cost
prices, it is incurring tremendous losses which it has no guarantee of recouping in the future.
See, e.g., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 ("[Tjhe
success of such [predatory] schemes is inherently uncertain: the short-rnm loss is definite, but
the long-rnm gain depends on successfully neutralizing the competition."). Professors Areeda
and Turner suggest that a predatory pricing scheme should only be found illegal where a firm is
selling its products at below marginal costs (or average costs, where marginal costs are difficult
to calculate). See generally Areeda & Tuner, supra note 75. Microsoft is giving away the
browser softvare for free, which would have them pricing below marginal costs regardless of
how low the marginal costs were for producing software. But see Klein, supra note 240 at 46
n.22. (suggesting that because vendors will pay Microsoft to get consumers to adopt Interet
Explorer, 'e competitive price of browser software is negative").
2000]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
could argue that computer purchasers often prefer to purchase their computers in
conjunction with other additional products-such as software 50 By bundling an
internet browser into its Windows operating system, Microsoft might actually be
creating a more desirable product.2 51 In regards to the restrictive dealings
contract, economic impact might be difficult to establish because of the
significant lag effects which delay the actual impact of an anticompetitve
activity.2 52 Of even more concern is the possibility, however slight, that the
Justice Department might erroneously253 win on the rule of reason issues. The
250 See Kenny & Jordan, supra note 24, at 1396:
Consumers of personal computers often prefer to purchase computers bundled with
peripheral equipment such as modem, monitor, printer and speakers. They have also
expressed a preference for the integration of software products, which initially came in
'separate boxes'-for example, printer drivers, disk defragmentation programs and hard
drive controllers-into one operating system. Although consumers could purchase
products in both these categories individually, they have expressed a preference to buy
these products at the same time.
25 1 See id; see generally Robert A. Levy, Microsoft's "Monopolies" Spur Competition,
SEAT=L TIMES, Jan. 7, 1998, at B5 (detailing how computer manufacturers have all bundled
various intemet browsers with Windows, because they realize that it produces a superior
product).
252 See supra note 75 and accompanying text
25 3 The length and complexity of the pending Microsoft case increases the likelihood that
the case will result in an irrational verdict. As an indication of the immense volume of
information that has been presented at trial, some testimony presented at the trial, such as the
direct testimony of AOL Senior Vice President David Colburn, has been presented in written
rather than oral form in order to save time. See Eun-Kyung Kim, Executive Tells How AOL,
Microsoft Struck Deal, BUFFALO NEws, Oct 28, 1998, at 3A. Additionally, U.S. District Court
Judge Penfield Jackson ruled that all 20 hours of a videotaped interview with Bill Gates would
be played at trial. See id It is unlikely that any judge or juror would be able to pay attention to
anything for 20 hours. As one observer at the Microsoft trial has noted:
[Justice Department Attorney] Burt's questions are so highly technical that the courtroom
is in a state of near stupor. (The room is also very hot which doesn't help.) Judge Thomas
Penfield Jackson is visibly struggling to stay awake. Even [witness] Gosling seems bored
to tears. Less than an hour into the aftemoon session, Jackson calls for an unprecedented
half-hour recess. We're guessing he needs a nap.
Joseph Nocera, The Empire Strikes Back, FORTUNE, Jan. 11, 1999, at 105. As the above
material indicates, judges and jurors have difficulty digesting the masses of information
available in an antitrust trial. Since this is a bench trial, the final outcome of the case will be
decided by Jackson. See, eg., Karen Donovan, And the Winner Is... , NAT'LLJ., July 5, 1999,
at Al. Because it seems highly unlikely that Jackson will be able to digest all of the information
available to him at trial, it is less likely that his decision will result in a rational outcome because
he is making a decision based upon partial knowledge.
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true economic impact of the tying arrangements and restrictive agreements are
still uncertain. Perhaps they harm consumers, perhaps they do not What is certain
is that if a court erroneously condemns Microsoft's business practices, then a
potentially beneficial business practice would be gone forever2
54
Under the new per se legality standard proposed by this Note, the Section 1
claims would be dismissed, thus eliminating the substantial costs associated with
a rule of reason trial. The problem with a dismissal of the Justice Department's
rule of reason claims against Microsoft is that dismissal might allow Microsoft to
continue its anticompetitive activities without any sort of check. However, even if
charges brought under the rule of reason are dismissed, Microsoft's activities will
still be checked by: (a) other antitrust laws; and (b) the free market
1. Microsoft May Still Be Prosecuted Under Other Antitrust Laws
It is important to remember that an antitrust defendant may be prosecuted
under judicial mechanisms other than just the rule of reason. Aside from just the
Sherman Act, defendants in some instances may be prosecuted under other
federal statutes, such as the Clayton Act,2 55 which was passed largely out of fear
that the rule of reason would render the Sherman Act toothless.2 56 In addition, an
antitrust plaintiff may also be prosecuted under state antitrust laws.2 57 In the
context of the Microsoft case, the most important alternatives to the rule of reason
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act are: (a) the per se illegality rule under Section
1; and (b) Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
As noted above, a business practice may be declared illegal per se under
254 See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
255 See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-19 (1994). More specifically, Section 18 of the Act
forbids a person from acquiring "directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or
other share capital ... of another person engaged also in commerce." See id. at § 18. A key goal
of Section 18 is to prevent firms from engaging in "coordinated interaction that harms
consumers"--the same type of competitive evil that is regulated by § I of the Sherman Act.
DEPARTMENT OF JusTicE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HoIizONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINEs, Apr. 2, 1992, § 2.1.
2 5 6 See JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTIJAL PROPERTY § 5.02(3) (1999)
("[The Clayton Act] was intended to cover specific abuses of economic power that the Sherman
Act appeared not to cover, or at least not to cover adequately."); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN &
HERBERT HOvENKAM, ANTmrRUST LAw, POLICY AND PROCEDURE 818 (1999) ("The Clayton
Act was passed in 1914, largely because Congress feared that the 'Rule of Reason' .. would
eviscerate the Sherman Act.").
257 See, ag., Califomia v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-02 (1989) (holding that state
antitrust laws are not subject to federal preemption merely because they might be interpreted to
impose liability on antitrust defendants beyond that imposed by federal antitrust law); see also
Richard C. Stanley, Antitrust Law, 36 LOY. L. REV. 665, 683 ([An] emerging principle in
antitrust is the meaningful use of state antitrust laws.").
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Section 1 of the Sherman Act where the defense can present absolutely no
procompetitive justifications for its actions.2 58 In the present case, Microsoft can
present no procompetitive justifications for many of its activities. 59
Section 2 of the Sherman Act states that one may not "monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states."260
The elements of a Section 2 monopolization claim are thought to consist of (a)
market power, and (b) some sort of monopolistic or anticompetitive conduct.2 61
The elements of attempted monopolization are (a) proof of specific intent to
monopolize; (b) proof of a dangerous probability that the attempt will succeed,
and (c) anticompetitive or exclusionary conduct.2 62
In its complaint, the government has alleged that Microsoft possesses market
power in the market for PC operating systems.2 63 The government has also
alleged that Microsoft's tying arrangements and exclusive dealing contracts
constitute monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.264 In the
alternative, the government has alleged that Microsoft has attempted to obtain
market power in the Intemet browser market in violation of the attempted
monopolization prohibition in Section 2.265
Given the findings of fact recently released by Judge Jackson,2 66 it does
appear that the Microsoft trial will be analyzed as a Section 2 violation.2 67 What
is more, Judge Jackson's findings of fact seem to demand the conclusion that
258 See supra note 82.
259 See United States v. Microsoft, Findings of Fact, 65 F. Supp2d 1, 44-49 (D.C. 1999);
see also ... And Nowfor the Endgame, Bus. WK., July 14, 1999 at 47.
260 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
261 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595 (1985); see
also GIFFORD & RAsIuND, supra note 17, at 333; SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 256, at
627. 262 See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993); Swift Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905); see also GiFFORD & RASKIND, supra note 17, at 401;
SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 256, at 723.263 See Plaintiffs Complaint at 49, United States v. Microsoft Corp. (No. 98-1232),
available at <http'//www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1700/1763.htm> (visited Apr. 20,2000).
264 See id.
265 See id.
266 See generally United States v. Microsoft, Findings of Fact, 65 F. Supp.2d 1 (D.C.
1999).
267 See Klein supra note 249, at 38 ("The recent Findings of Fact in United States v.
Microsoft paint a vivid picture of a monopolist abusing its dominant position.'); see also Karen
Donovan, Microsoft Faces Stiff Hurdles on Appeal: Judge Jackson Seems to Have
Bulletproofed His Key Fact Findings, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 22, 1999, at A5 ("Judge Jackson's
stunning findings make it hard to remember that the Justice Departments original case against
Microsoft amounted to a simple tie-in claim.").
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Microsoft is in violation of Section 2. First, Judge Jackson concludes that
Microsoft does possess market power in the PC operating systems market.2 68
Second, Judge Jackson concludes that icrosoft's activities do amount to
monopolization.2 69 While Judge Jackson's ultimate conclusions of law have yet
to be released, all factors seem to indicate that Microsoft can be effectively
prosecuted under Section 2, regardless of the outcome under the rule of reason.
2. Even ifMicrosoft 's Activities Were to Escape Scrutiny Under the
Antitrust Laws, the Free Market Will Act as an Effective Regulator of
Microsoft
There remains the slight possibility that Microsoft would avoid prosecution
under other devices such as Section 2 of the Sherman Act. If all rule of reason
issues were to be dismissed, as suggested by this Note, then Microsoft would be
able to completely avoid scrutiny under the courts. If inefficient, then Microsoft's
business practices would be left for the market to fix. As noted above, given the
intense level of competition in the computer industry, coupled with a rapid rate of
technological advancement, this process might occur very quickly.270 In the case
of Microsoft, however, the process might occur more slowly because of two
separate factors. First, because intellectual property law gives Microsoft a
property right over its Windows code, it is very difficult for competitors to
develop duplicate products. 271 Second, because Windows represents the
dominant operating system in the computer industry, computer software writers
will write the majority of their software for Windows.2 72 Because most of the
software available is written for Windows, people will naturally purchase
Windows as their operating system.2 73 Thus, the dominance of Microsoft over the
operating systems market is self-perpetuating. 274
268 See Microsoft, supra note 266, at 10-16 ("Microsoft enjoys so much power in the
market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems that if it wished to exercise this power solely
in terms of price, it could charge a price for Windows substantially above that which could be
charged in a competitive market").
26 9 See id at 102 ("As has been shown, Microsoft also engaged in a concerted series of
actions designed to protect the applications barrier to entry, and hence its monopoly power for a
variety of middleware threats .... Many of these threats have harmed consumers in ways that
are immediate and easily discernible.").
270 See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
271 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change Everything? The
Competitive Propriety ofa Proprietary Standard, 43 ANTriRusT BULL. 715, 716 (1998).
272 See Plaintiffs Complaint at 57, United States v. Microsoft Corp. (No. 98-1232),
available at <http.//wvvw.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1700/1763.htm> (visited Apr. 20,2000).
2 7 3 See id
274 See United States v. Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.C. 1999) ("What for Microsoft
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However, despite such high barriers to entry in the operating systems
market-given the rapid pace of technology in the computer industry, one major
technological breakthrough could render Microsoft's market dominance
worthless. Such a breakthrough might be the Java programming language. Java is
a programming code, which is capable of working on many different operating
systems and web browsers z75 If Java became the dominant programming code,
then Microsoft's operating system dominance would become less disturbing 276
Because a program could be run on any available operating system, consumers
would choose their browser based upon the merits of the browser, instead of the
amount of programs compatible with that browser. 277 However, the whole
purpose of Microsoft's actions are to limit the dissemination of Java technology.
In its complaint, the Justice Department alleges that many of Microsoft's business
tactics are designed to stop the dissemination of Java programming through the
is a positive feedback loop is for would-be competitors a vicious cycle."); see also id
("Economies of Scale and network effects, which reinforce one another, result in high barriers
to entry."); Salop & Romaine, supra note 26, at 621 ('As a result of this positive feedback
process, a single operating system can achieve a dominant or monopoly position"); Mark A.
Lemly & David McGowan, Could Java Change Everything? The Competitive Propriety of a
Proprietary Standard, in SECOND ANNuAL INTERNET LAW INsTITUTE, at 453 (Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 520, 1998) ("TIThe
operating systems market is characterized by strong (albeit virtual) network effects, meaning
that users will naturally gravitate towards a single standard platform and tend to stay there.").
2 75 See Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at 2, Sun Microsystems v. Microsoft
Corp., (N.D. Cal. 1998) (No. C-97-20884 RMW) ("[Java is] a standardized application
programming environment that affords software developers the opportunity to create and
distribute a single version of a programming code which is capable of operating on many
different, otherwise incompatible systems platforms and browsers."); see also Lernley &
McGowan, supra note 274, at 717 (same).
2 76 See Saul P. Mortenson & Eamon O'Kelly, Antitrust Enforcement in High Technology
Industries: Keeping Cyberspace Safe for Innovators or Just Another Speed Trap on the
Information Superhighway?, in 19TH ANNUAL INSITrUTE ON COMNTrrER LAW, at 1009, 1033
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 547,
1999) (noting how the development of the Java programming language might lead to increased
competition in the operating systems market); see generally Lemley & McGowan, supra note
274. Scott McNeely, the founder of the Sun Microsystems company which developed Java, is
particularly optimistic, as he predicts: "I wouldn't be surprised if four years from now
Microsoft's market capitalization fell from $300 billion to $1 billion." See Andrew Glass,
Microsoft: At Some Point Gates Will Have to Strike Deal, DAYrON DAILY NEWS, Feb. 16,
1999, at 6A. However, Lemley and McGowan also voice a concern that, while the Microsoft
monopoly might be reduced, the rise of Java might result in Sun Microsystems as a new
monopoly power. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 258, at 751.
2 77 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 274, at 717-18 ("Java offers the opportunity of
platfonn-independant computing. . . [which would] allow both consumers and programmers to
choose operating systems free of the constraints (but while enjoying the benefits) of network
effects.').
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Internet, thus preserving its dominant position.2 78 In particular, it is alleged that
Microsoft was trying to eliminate Netscape Navigator, a web browser that was
actually working as a "platform" from which Java programs could be
produced.2 79 However, even if Microsoft is allowed to run an unimpeded attack
upon Netscape, it will not likely succeed in preventing the dissemination of Java
technology. Netscape's share of the browser market remains strong,280 meaning
that it has ample opportunity to distribute Java. Even if Netscape were unable to
distribute Java, there is the possibility that it could be distributed through other
browsers. Additionally, Microsoft continues to face competition from other
operating systems, including the emerging Unix and Linux operating systerns.281
The presence of paradigm-shifting technology such as Java, indicates that the
rapidly-developing and fiercely competitive computer industry is fully capable of
handling the Microsoft problem2 82
278 See Plaintiffs Complaint at 1-6, United States v. Microsoft Corp. (No. 98-1232),
available at <http'//www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1700/1763.htm> (visited Apr. 20,2000).
279 See idt at 3-4 ("Microsoft recognized that Netscape's browser was itself a 'platform'
to which many [Java] applications were being written ... ").
280 In presenting its side of the case, Microsoft's council has presented evidence that
Netscape Navigator was bundled with 22% of all personal computer shipments and that it
owned 24% of the market of top Internet Service Providers. See Karen Donovan, Microsoft
Turns Tables, NAT'L LJ., June 14, 1999, at A7. Microsoft has also presented evidence that,
during the first week of the Microsoft trial, there were 1.8 million downloads of Netscape
Navigator from the Internet. See id (The accuracy of this figure is dubious. If extrapolated over
one year, the 1.8 million figure results in one Netscape Navigator download for every 1.6
Internet users in the world.) See id In addition, it is at least arguable that Netscape's merger
with the online services provider America Online will increase Netscape's ability to compete.
See, e.g., Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Microsoft Says AOL Deal Undercuts Antitrust Case, WASH.
POsT, Apr. 29,1999, at El; Associated Press, AOL Combo CouldRival Giant: Netscape Buy
Would Let AOL Send a Challenge to Microsoft, STAR TRIB. NEWsPAPER OF THE TWIN CITIES,
Nov. 24, 1998, at ID ("The planned marriage of America Online and Netscape would create a
single Internet company with remarkable reach across the high-tech world-and influence to
challenge giant Microsofts dominance in key areas."). However, Netscape's merger with AOL
could also be characterized as the end result of Microsofrs anticompetitive conduct-as a
weakened Netscape is forced to submit to a merger in order to survive.
281 See Mortenson & O'Kelly, supra note 276 at 1033. In regards to the Linux system, see
Dem Foust, Can Red Hat Stay Red Hot?, Bus. WK., July 5, 1999, at 85 (noting the success of
Red Hat Software Inc.'s Linux operating system, which has been given away for free in order
to grab a solid market share).
282 But is there a problem in the first place? The market for operating systems might be
such that it is actually efficient for there to be only one dominant firm. Those writing software
might be deterred from the extra effort that it will take to write several programs for a variety of
operating systems. See Salop & Romaine, supra note 26, at 617 (discussing how expensive and
time-consuming it is to rewrite an application for each different operating system). Thus
Microsoft's market dominance might encourage innovation in the software industry. See
Shapiro, supra note 178, at 29 (noting that one dominant technology may actually be beneficial
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Under the rule of reason in its present state, the Microsoft litigation will result
in a long and expensive trial. The government bears a heavy burden in proving
the rule of reason issues. If the government does not lose, then there is the risk of
a false positive. Under the per se legality standard suggested by this Note, the
costs associated with litigating rule of reason issues would be eliminated, as
would the risks of a false positive. Additionally, the per se legality standard
results in the same outcome as would most likely occur in a rule of reason trial.
While the per se legality standard insulates Microsoft from Section 1 liability
under the law, Microsoft remains liable under other overlapping areas of antitrust
law, such as Section 2. In addition, there is a strong possibility that the ultra-
competitive computer market will regulate Microsoft's conduct so as to produce
the most efficient result.
V. CONCLUSION
As a jibe against the free-market theories expressed by Chicago-school
economists, it is often asked:
Question: "How many Chicago economists does it take to change a
lightbulb?"
Answer. "None. If it needs changing, the market would have changed it
already.' 2 83
This joke expresses a common criticism of the Chicago school. Market
responses to economic problems, if they occur at all, will never be quick and
painless. However, one thing to consider is that rule of reason antitrust trials, also,
will never be quick and painless. They are long, and they are expensive. They are
difficult for judges and juries to handle. In addition, there is the risk of
erroneously condemning a practice which is actually procompetitive. It is true that
the free market might not be an ideal method for handling rule of reason cases,
but it is better then the next best alternative.
for consumers, because they do not have to worry about their products getting replaced by
different products).
283 Markovits, supra note 35, at 86.
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